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Workers’ Compensation (WC) is a large social insurance program that provides medical 
care and cash benefits to workers injured on the job.  Each WC claim involves several 
different parties—the injured worker, employer, doctor, insurer, and, if applicable, a 
third-party case manager.  To date, the literature has primarily focused on worker 
responses to incentives, and estimates of worker responsiveness to benefit levels in the 
1980s are widely cited.  Little is known about how other parties respond to incentives or 
how worker responsiveness may have changed after the WC policy reforms of the 1990s.  
In response to rising employer costs, many states have passed policy reforms to reduce 
these costs.  In this dissertation, I examine how different actors respond to changing 
incentives in WC, with a focus on the policy reforms of the 1990s.   
 In Chapter 2, I complement the WC incidence literature by updating the estimated 
elasticity of WC receipt with respect to benefits by using data from the 1990s and 
reconciling the differences between previously published estimates.  I find much lower 
  
levels of worker responsiveness, even after controlling for the policies that made it more 
difficult for workplace injuries to qualify for WC benefits and employers shifted to self-
insurance.  I also find that increased prevalence of self-insurance reduces the probability 
a worker will claim WC benefits. 
 In Chapter 3, I focus on a reform enacted by the state of Ohio that changed 
incentives to third-party case managers for getting injured workers back to work.  During 
the mid-1990s, the Ohio state insurer contracted out case management services, and the 
contracts incorporated a large bonus incentive payment intended to reward contractors for 
reducing claim duration.  The bonus payment is essentially a decreasing function of 
average days away from work, excluding claims extending longer than 15 months.  
Therefore, duration is predicted to decrease for minor claims and increase for some 
severe claims so that the claimants remain out of work longer than 15 months and are 
excluded from the bonus payment calculation.  I find contractor responses are consistent 
with the expected heterogeneous responses of a profit-maximizing firm but inconsistent 
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Workers’ Compensation (WC) is a large social insurance program that provides medical 
care and cash benefits to workers who are injured on the job.  The medical care for 
injured workers costs $26.2 billion each year, nearly two percent of all health care 
spending in the United States.1  The cash benefits awarded to injured workers each year 
are as large as those conferred by many other major social insurance programs, such as 
Unemployment Insurance (UI), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), and 
Food Stamps.2  Employers are mandated to provide WC insurance, and nominal costs to 
employers are greater than those incurred for UI.3  Similar to UI, benefits and costs for 
WC vary across states, and state policymakers are concerned that high employer costs 
will make their state less attractive to business.   
 Between the late 1980s and early 1990s, employers experienced a particularly 
large run-up in WC costs.  Employer costs rose by over 25 percent between 1987 and 
their peak in 1993.4  This growth in costs can be attributed largely to the 44 percent 
                                                 
1 In 2005, total health care spending in the U.S. was $1,987.7 billion (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services).  
2 In 2002, WC cash benefits totaled $28.1 billion (Sengupta et al., 2006), $25.4 billion was spent on TANF 
(Administration for Children and Families, Department of Health and Human Services), $19 billion on 
Food Stamps, and $43.3 billion on UI, up from $24.8 billion in UI benefits paid in 2001 (U.S. House of 
Representatives).   
3 National Compensation Survey, Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
4 Sengupta et al., 2006. 
 
2 
increase in benefits paid during this same time period.5  In response, more employers 
turned to self-insurance and many states passed policy reforms in an effort to reduce 
these employer costs.6  Several different types of policies were enacted, some of which 
addressed employer costs directly by deregulating premiums.7  Other policies sought to 
decrease employer costs by reducing the total amount of benefits paid to injured workers, 
either by making it more difficult for benefits to be awarded or by attempting to get 
injured workers back to work sooner.  In some states, such as Ohio, there were sweeping 
changes to WC.  The formerly public-run system was essentially privatized in 1997.  
Although there is some empirical evidence about the efficacy of these reforms (e.g., 
Boden and Ruser, 2003; Neumark et al., 2005; Ruser et al., 2004), many unanswered 
questions remain, and I address two of them in this dissertation.  Though many of these 
policies were intended to reduce claims, the prior research concerning the impact of the 
policy reforms on the likelihood of claiming WC is inconclusive.  Furthermore, there is 
no other research that examines the impact of self-insurance on the probability a worker 
claims WC.8  Perhaps there is no consensus because state WC systems and policies are so 
nuanced that characterizing the reforms in the same way obscures important differences 
across states.  In Chapter 3, I focus on policy changes in a particular state, and I know of 
no other paper that carefully considers a single state’s WC system in analysis of the 
policy reforms of the 1990s.  
                                                 
5 Sengupta et al., 2006. 
6 Sengupta et al., 2006. 
7 Barkume and Ruser, 2001. 
8 Boden and Ruser (2003) examine the impact of the policies on workplace injury rates.  Neumark et al. 
(2004) look at the impact of one particular reform, employers selecting the doctor, on the length and cost of 
cash benefit claims, not the probability a claim occurs.  Using the sample of injured workers from the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth-1979, Ruser et al. (2004) find no impact of the different policies on 
the probability a workplace injury occurs on injured worker claims cash benefits.  However, as dicussed in 
Chapter 2, their sample may be too small or too young to find an effect. 
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In this dissertation, I examine the impact of several of these WC policy changes 
on claiming behavior.  In the present chapter, I describe the WC program and the policy 
environment of the 1990s.  I summarize the current literature addressing WC, and show 
that there is a need for an updated estimated elasticity of benefit receipt in the 1990s.   In 
Chapter 2, I find that the estimated elasticity of WC cash benefit receipt with respect to 
benefit levels is lower in the 1990s than in the 1980s.  This estimate is robust to 
accounting for the policy reforms of the 1990s and the prevalence of self-insurance.  
Furthermore, I show that higher rates of self-insurance indeed make workers less likely to 
claim WC benefits.  I find the policy reforms had no effect on the probability a worker 
claims WC, a result that might arise if there truly is no effect or if characterizing the 
reforms in such a uniform way obscures important variation in the reforms and the state 
WC systems.  Therefore, in Chapter 3 I examine a change to the WC system in one state. 
 In Chapter 3, I examine the privatization of WC in the state of Ohio.  During the 
mid-1990s, the Ohio state insurer contracted out case management services, and the 
contracts incorporated a large bonus incentive payment intended to reward contractors for 
reducing claim duration.  The bonus payment is essentially a decreasing function of 
average days away from work, excluding claims extending longer than 15 months.  
Therefore, duration is predicted to decrease for minor claims and increase for some 
severe claims so that the claimants remain out of work for longer than 15 months and are 
excluded from the bonus payment calculation.  I find that contractor responses are 
consistent with the heterogeneous responses of a profit-maximizing firm but inconsistent 
with the state’s intentions.  In addition to illustrating the importance of carefully 
designing incentives, Chapter 3 demonstrates the importance of understanding the 
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nuances of state WC systems and reforms.  The results would make little sense without a 
clear understanding of the bonus payment. 
 
1.2 Background 
1.2.1 Workers’ Compensation Insurance 
Workers’ Compensation is regulated by states, with several key features of the program 
common to all states.  States mandate that employers provide WC insurance at the benefit 
levels set by each state.  Workers injured on the job are entitled to medical care for their 
injury, and once a worker misses one week of work, he or she is eligible to receive cash 
benefits to replace lost earnings.  Cash benefits generally replace two-thirds of pre-injury 
earnings, subject to a maximum benefit value.  
 Employers can obtain WC coverage in one of three ways.  Employers may 
purchase insurance from private companies, from the state, or, if the company is large 
enough, the employer may self-insure.9  Nationwide, approximately half of all benefits 
are paid by private insurers, with the other half split approximately evenly between state 
insurers and self-insured employers (Sengupta et al., 2006).  In states that offer all three 
forms of insurance, the only employers that purchase public insurance are those with loss 
histories so poor that the company is unable to acquire private insurance.  In five states, 
including Ohio, private insurance is not offered.  In these states all smaller employers 
purchase public insurance and larger employers may self-insure.10  If an employer 
purchases WC insurance from a private or public insurer, the premiums are an increasing 
                                                 
9 Self-insured employers must provide the state-mandated level of benefits. 
10 The five states are Ohio, North Dakota, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.  In 2005, nearly 20 
percent of the benefits paid in Ohio were paid by self-insured employers (Sengupta, et al., 2006). 
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function of how risky the employer’s business is (base premium) and the employer’s loss 
history (experience rate).  For example, in Ohio, the base premium for coal miners is 
approximately ten times that of university professors.11  Smaller employers simply pay 
these base premiums, and WC premiums are experience rated for larger or riskier 
employers.  Experience rated employers with worse than average loss histories pay more 
than this base rate, and vice versa.  
 Workers’ Compensation claims fall into two commonly used categories: “medical 
only” and “cash benefits.”  Those claimants who only receive medical care and return to 
work within one week are called medical only recipients.  Claimants missing more than 
one week of work are awarded both medical care and cash benefits and are labeled cash 
benefit recipients.  Although cash benefit claims comprise only 20 percent of all claims, 
they incur nearly 95 percent of benefits—medical care and cash payments (Sengupta et 
al., 2006).  Furthermore, costs are concentrated in a fraction of the cases.  Sengupta et al. 
(2006) estimate that 35 percent of cash beneficiaries are responsible for 80 percent of the 
costs.   
 Cash benefits generally replace two thirds of a worker’s pre-injury weekly 
earnings, subject to a maximum that varies across states.  A typical cash benefit schedule 
is depicted in Figure 1-1.  In Colorado in 2001, workers earning less than $891 per week 
receive weekly benefits in the amount of two thirds of their pre-injury earnings until the 
benefits reach the maximum of $594 per week.12  The biggest sources of variation across 
states are the level of the maximum and the share of the workforce who earn enough to 
                                                 
11 Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation 2006 State Fund Manual.  The base rate for Coal Miners (Codes 
1005, 1016) is $4.52 and $6.82 per $100 of payroll, respectively, whereas the base rate for university 
professors (Code 8868) is $0.61 per $100 of payroll. 
12 Some states actually have minimum benefit levels (e.g., Ohio)  or replace 100 percent of a worker’s pre-
injury earnings up to a certain point (e.g., California). 
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be eligible for the maximum benefit.  Workers whose earnings place them above the 
maximum benefit of the WC schedule face average earnings replacement rates between 
40 and 50 percent whereas the average earnings replacement rate below the maximum is 
close to 70 percent.  In Table 1-1, Panels A and B depict the variation across states in the 
generosity of WC benefits, as illustrated by the level of the maximum benefit in 2001.  
Panel A depicts the ten states with the lowest maximum.  In 2001, the most recent year of 
data used in the analysis in Chapter 2, injured workers in Mississippi receive up to $316 
dollars per week.  Half of all workers in Mississippi earned enough to place them above 
the maximum benefit and the average replacement rate in Mississippi was .54.  That is, 
most workers in Mississippi would receive benefits totaling 54 percent of their pre-injury 
earnings.  In contrast, states with high maximum benefits, as depicted in Panel B, have a 
smaller share of workers earning enough to place them above the maximum benefit, and 
the average replacement rates are higher, falling between .62 and .79 
 In Figure 1-2, I illustrate the two margins that are commonly studied in the WC 
literature—the decision to claim benefits and the decision concerning how long to receive 
benefits.  Consider the decision to claim WC benefits.  A worker is injured on the job.  
The worker’s decision to pursue a WC claim occurs when the worker seeks medical care.  
If the worker pays for the medical care out of pocket or with his or her health insurance, 
the injury will never enter the WC system.  An injured worker might choose not to file 
for WC if the benefits are not generous, or if the worker is discouraged from filing 
benefits by his or her employer.  Once the worker seeks WC to cover the workplace 
injury, the doctor becomes the gatekeeper of the WC system.  The doctor is considered 
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the gatekeeper because he or she assigns a diagnosis to the injury and certifies that the 
injury is work-related.     
A claim will end when the injured worker heals completely and returns to work at 
full capacity, or heals partially and returns to work at a restricted level.  In some cases, a 
worker’s condition stabilizes and the physician ascertains that the worker will not 
improve sufficiently to return to the workplace and is permanently disabled from the 
injury.  In these cases, the injured worker receives permanent benefits.  Conflicting 
motives regarding the length of a claim make it difficult for injured workers, employers, 
insurers, or state policymakers to influence when a claim will end.  A worker who values 
leisure may wish to remain out of work longer when benefits are more generous (Butler 
and Worrall, 1985; Krueger, 1991; Meyer et al., 1995; and Neuhauser and Raphael, 
2004).  Employers and insurers desire shorter claims to reduce costs, and states seek a 
balance between lowering employer costs, to keep the state attractive for business, and 
protecting injured workers.    
 Injured workers, employers, insurers, and state policymakers have different tools 
at their disposal to influence the duration of a claim.  The injured worker may select a 
doctor who will most likely certify the injury as work-related and allow the worker to 
remain away from work (Neumark et al., 2005).  The employer may attempt to expedite 
return-to-work by finding ways to accommodate a recovering worker in the workplace 
(Krueger, 1991).  Insurers may directly encourage the worker to go back to work and 
offer employers suggestions for how an injured worker might be accommodated in the 




1.2.2 Claiming Trends in Workers’ Compensation 
 
During the 1980s, benefit receipt patterns remained roughly constant.  However, in the 
1990s, the incidence rate fell.  As shown in Hirsch et al. (1997), the incidence rate of WC 
receipt hovered around 1.5 between 1977 and 1993.  That is, each year about 1.5 percent 
of all covered workers begin to receive WC cash benefits.  However, as shown in Figure 
1-3, the incidence rate fell by 40 percent between 1993 and 2001.  The incidence rate can 
fall if fewer injuries occur or if injured workers are less likely to file claims.  Injured 
workers might be less likely to file claims if benefits are less generous, the probability a 
claim is accepted falls, or if worker responsiveness to benefit levels changed.   
 Some of this decline in the incidence rate between 1993 and 2001 may reflect that 
workplaces became safer.  As shown in Table 1-2, the injury rate fell in every industry 
between 1992 and 2001.13  Columns (1) and (2) contain the injury rates for each industry 
in 1992 and 2001.  In 1992, there were 12.5 injuries per 100 manufacturing workers 
whereas in 2001 there were only 8.1 injuries per 100 workers.  Furthermore, there was a 
shift in employment toward safer industries in the 1990s.  Manufacturing is one of the 
most dangerous industries and the services industry is one of the safer industries—in 
2001 the incidence rate was 4.6 injuries per 100 full-time workers.14  As shown in Figure 
1-4, between 1989 and 2001 there was a shift in employment away from manufacturing 
and towards services.  Whereas in 1989, 26 percent of workers were employed in the 
manufacturing industry, by 2001 the share fell to 19.5.  In contrast, the share of the 
workforce employed in the services industry rose from 27.2 percent in 1989 to 34 percent 
                                                 
13 1992 was the most recent year of data available. 
14 Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Incidence rates of nonfatal occupational injuries and illnesses by industry and 
selected case types, 2001. http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/osh/os/ostb1129.pdf. Viewed April 16, 2008. 
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in 2001.  These improvements in workplace safety likely impacted the incidence rate of 
WC receipt.  
 A decline in benefit generosity may also impact the incidence rate; however, 
benefit generosity did not change much during the 1990s.  To illustrate this, in Figure 1-
5, I plot mean real expected weekly benefits and average real weekly earnings from 1989 
through 2001.  To quantify benefit generosity relative to earnings, consider the 
replacement rate—the ratio of benefits to earnings.  The mean replacement rate changed 
little over the decade, remaining around .65, as shown in Figure 1-6.15  Therefore, it is 
unlikely that benefit generosity influenced the decline in the incidence rate. 
 For the same level of benefits, workers facing a lower probability a claim will be 
accepted are less likely to receive WC.  Therefore, when thinking about explanations for 
the decline in the incidence rate it is also important to consider changes to the probability 
a claim will be accepted.  During the 1990s, several states enacted policy reforms that 
made it more difficult for injured workers to be awarded WC benefits.  In the next 
section, I describe some of the trends that led to these policy reforms and then discuss the 
character of the reforms that reduced the probability a claim would be awarded benefits. 
 
1.2.3 Workers’ Compensation Expenditures in the 1990s 
From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, the amount paid in WC benefits increased by 
thirty percent—the amount paid for medical benefits increased by 50 percent whereas the 
amount paid for cash benefits increased by 20 percent.  In Figure 1-7, I plot the total real 
medical and cash benefits paid between 1987 and 2005, in millions.  These increases in 
                                                 
15 It is not surprising that the replacement rate did not change much during the 1990s.  Most states set cash 
benefit parameters as a function of the state’s average weekly earnings. 
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benefits paid translated into increased costs to employers.  Between 1987 and 1992, 
employer costs for WC increased 22 percent, from $57.9 billion to $70.6 billion, as 
shown in Figure 1-8.  Since WC is a state program, employer costs vary across states.  To 
remain competitive to business, states wish to keep WC costs low to attract and keep 
business.  In reaction to these increased employer costs, more employers turned to self-
insurance and several states enacted policy reforms intended to reduce WC spending and, 
correspondingly, employer costs.   
 Self-insuring for WC can reduce employer costs in one of two ways.  First, safer 
than average employers might see cost savings from moving to self-insurance.  Since WC 
premiums are not perfectly experienced rated, safer employers subsidize riskier 
employers.  Therefore, by turning to self-insurance, costs fall for the safest employers.  
Second, and more relevant for this dissertation, self-insurance might also make 
workplaces safer.  Self-insuring employers enjoy all of the increases in workplace safety 
in the form of lower WC costs, so self-insuring employers have greater motivation to 
keep injuries from occurring and minimize the severity of injuries.  As shown in Figure 
1-9, the share of benefits paid by self-insuring employers rose to its peak between 1987 
and 1998, a period when WC receipt was declining. 
1.2.4 Workers’ Compensation Policy Changes 
Approximately two-thirds of all states enacted some type of reform to their WC system in 
the 1990s.  Some of these reforms directly addressed employer costs for WC by 
deregulating premiums or expanding opportunities for self-insurance.  Advocates for 
deregulation argue that by introducing competition, premiums will fall, and 19 states 
deregulated WC premiums between 1989 and 1995 (Barkume and Ruser, 2001).  
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Deregulation efforts continued in the second half of the 1990s, including campaigns in 
New York and Florida.  Barkume and Ruser (2001) find that, after deregulation, WC 
premiums fell by 13.7 percent.16 
Other changes to WC aimed to reduce costs by making it harder for a claim to 
enter the WC system or by reducing the amount of time a worker misses from work.  
Some reforms were intended to impact the incidence of WC receipt whereas others 
sought to get injured workers to return to work more quickly.  In Table 1-3, I present the 
four most common types of reforms expected to reduce WC receipt, as categorized in 
Boden and Ruser (2003) and Ruser et al. (2004).  Each of these reforms is expected to 
decrease the number of WC claims, either by discouraging workers from filing claims or 
making it harder for filed claims to be accepted.  Oregon was the first state to pass major 
WC reforms, and the legislative changes were effective in 1990.  In other states, the bulk 
of the legislation went into effect in 1992 and 1993. 
 Many states enacted stiff penalties for employees found guilty of filing fraudulent 
claims, which may have discouraged workers from filing claims.  Other reforms made it 
harder for filed claims to be accepted.  Several states granted employers the privilege of 
selecting which doctor treats a workplace injury.  Since doctors serve as gatekeepers to 
the WC system, this reform enables employers to choose physicians who are expected to 
be more conservative about what they consider a valid workplace injury.  Other reforms 
limited a doctor’s ability to designate an injury as work-related.  Some states began to 
require that injured workers and their doctors provide objective medical evidence to 
                                                 
16 Although this is an important change to WC, it is unclear how deregulating premiums would impact the 
probability a worker receives WC cash benefits or how long the worker remains out of work.  Therefore, I 
do not consider deregulating premiums in this dissertation. 
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prove the existence of a workplace injury, making it more difficult for injured workers to 
receive WC for injuries such as back pain and carpal tunnel syndrome.  Several states 
also made it harder for workers to be awarded compensation if the workplace injury 
aggravates a pre-existing condition, a reform that will especially impact older workers 
who are more likely to suffer from other conditions (Burton and Spieler, 2001).  In 
Chapter 2, I examine the impact of the increased prevalence of self-insurance and these 
policy reforms on the WC incidence rate. 
 Other reforms sought to reduce costs by impacting a claim’s duration, or the 
amount of time between when a worker leaves work because of his or her injury and 
when the worker has healed and returns to the job.  In Chapter 3, I examine one such 
reform enacted by the state of Ohio, one of five states in which employers must purchase 
WC insurance from the state (or self-insure).  In response to rising employer costs, the 
state contracted out WC case management responsibilities to companies called Third-
Party Case Managers (TCMs) with the hope that, as private companies, TCMs might be 
able to get injured workers back on the job more efficiently than if the state continued to 




There are two main strands to the WC literature; one examines the extensive margin, the 
receipt of WC benefits, and the other examines the intensive margin, how long a worker 
receives benefits.  When benefits become more generous, injured workers are more likely 
                                                 
17 In Ohio and the larger WC community, TCMs are referred to as Managed Care Organizations (MCOs); 
however, I refer to them as TCMs to avoid confusion with health insurance MCOs, which are structured 
differently.   
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to claim cash benefits (Bronchetti, 2007; Hirsch et al. 1997; Krueger, 1990; Neuhauser 
and Raphael, 2004; Ruser et al., 2004; and Ruser, 1985) and receive those benefits longer 
(Butler and Worrall, 1985; Krueger, 1991; Meyer et al., 1995; and Neuhauser and 
Raphael, 2004).  Although the magnitude of the elasticity is sensitive to the dataset used 
as well as to the specification, it is always positive, providing evidence that workers do 
respond to the incentives built into the WC system.     
 
1.3.1 Incidence of Workers’ Compensation Receipt 
Papers examining the incidence of WC receipt focus on the relationship between WC 
benefit levels and claiming.  When benefits are more generous, workers may be more 
willing to take risks at the workplace, a moral hazard problem.  Even in the absence of 
moral hazard, more generous benefits might increase WC receipt because workers may 
be more likely to file for WC, this response is called the reporting effect.  Several papers 
use Current Population Survey (CPS) data to address the relationship between benefit 
levels and claiming WC cash benefits. 
Krueger (1990) was the first to use individual level data to analyze the impact of 
increased benefit generosity on the WC incidence rate using CPS data.  He estimates an 
elasticity with respect to benefits of .74 when controlling for worker characteristics, state, 
year, industry, and occupation.  That is, a ten percent increase in benefits leads to a 7.4 
percent increase in the incidence rate.  This result is higher than previous results from 
aggregate data and higher than many subsequent results using individual level data. 
 Hirsch, Macpherson, and DuMond (1997) update Krueger’s work to include 
union membership.  Union members may be more responsive to WC benefit levels than 
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non-union workers if unions make workers more aware of WC filing procedures and 
offer workplace protections to employees who file claims.  Since union members are also 
paid higher wages (and awarded higher benefits) than non-union members, omitting a 
control for union membership will impose an upward bias on the coefficient describing 
the impact of benefits on WC receipt.  Similar to Krueger (1990), the authors find a 
positive and significant relationship between benefit levels and the WC incidence rate.  
However, the estimated elasticity is approximately .18, much lower than the .74 
estimated by Krueger (1990).18  Both of these papers rely on data from the 1980s, so in 
Chapter 2 I provide an estimated elasticity for the 1990s. 
Bronchetti (2007) also updates Krueger’s work and uses CPS data from 1977 
through 2004.19  She finds an estimated elasticity of benefit receipt of .38, approximately 
half as large as Krueger (1990).  While this suggests that worker responsiveness to 
benefits declined during the 1990s, she does not separately isolate the 1990s in her work.  
Therefore, it is difficult to know if the lower elasticity she finds is a result of including 
the 1990s or, alternatively, arises from a difference in sample creation or her final 
specification.20   
The Relationship Between Benefit Generosity and Claiming 
Two possible mechanisms describe how higher benefits lead to increased WC receipt.  
Higher benefits might induce workers to take more risks, and more injuries occur, or, 
conditional on being injured at work, workers are more likely to claim WC.  With the 
                                                 
18 In a footnote, Hirsch et al. (1997) suggest their results differ from Krueger’s because 1983-1985 were 
unrepresentative years.  Hirsch et al. (1997) claim that when they restrict their sample to those years, their 
results “…closely resemble his.”  In Chapter 2, I show how sample restriction criteria impact both sets of 
results.  
19 The first draft of Chapter 2 was written in 2005, concurrent to the work done by Bronchetti (2007). 
20 Bronchetti (2007) acknowledges that even when restricting her attention to the same years as Krueger 
(1990), she is not able to replicate his results.  She suggests the differences may arise because of different 
methodologies used to match workers across years or different sample selection criteria.   
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CPS data, it is not possible to distinguish between these two mechanisms because the 
data simply capture whether an individual receives WC, not whether injuries occur and 
whether the injured worker pursues a cash benefit claim.  However, two datasets contain 
this level of detail, California claims data and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
(NLSY).  Papers using these datasets find support for reporting effects and statistically 
significant relationships between benefit levels and incidence.   
Unlike most states, which peg the maximum WC benefit to state average weekly 
earnings, the maximum benefit is set statutorily in California.  The maximum benefit may 
remain stagnant for several years and then experience a large increase, as in California in 
1994 and 1995.  In 1994, the maximum benefit increased from $336 to $406 per week.  
Neuhauser and Raphael (2004) exploit variation in the maximum benefit level over time 
and across workers who are expected to be impacted by the increase (high earners) and 
those who are not expected to be impacted (low earners) to assess the impact of benefit 
increases on claiming behavior.  The authors use California administrative claims data to 
examine this issue.  By definition, all of the individuals in the administrative claims 
database suffered a workplace injury, so any changes in the observed incidence of cash 
benefit receipt result from the reporting effect (since individuals are in the data 
conditional on suffering a workplace injury).  Conditional on receiving medical WC 
benefits, the authors find a cash benefit elasticity around .5.  That is, a ten percent 
increase in benefits makes injured workers receiving WC medical care five percent more 
likely to claim cash benefits. 
Ruser et al. (2004) use the NLSY-1979 to examine the relationship between 
benefit generosity and WC claims in the 1990s.  With the NLSY, the authors are able to 
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separately identify being hurt on the job, missing work as a result of a workplace injury, 
and claiming WC benefits.  This allows the authors to address why benefit generosity 
matters, and the authors find no evidence of a relationship between benefit generosity and 
injury rates, casting doubt on the moral hazard explanation.  In contrast, they cite strong 
evidence in support of reporting effects.  Conditional on suffering a workplace injury, a 
ten percent increase in benefit levels increases the claim rate by 5.8 percent.  
These papers offer insight into the moral hazard and reporting effects 
explanations.  However, because each paper examines changes to the claim rate, 
conditional on injury, it is difficult to directly compare the estimated elasticities to those 
of Hirsch et al. (1997) and Krueger.  Therefore, to provide a direct comparison, in 
Chapter 2 I update Krueger (1990) using data from the 1990s. 
 Evidence Concerning Policy Changes from the 1990s 
When considering worker responsiveness to benefit levels in the 1990s, it is important to 
account for the changes to the WC system.  The changes expected to have an impact on 
claim incidence include the increased prevalence of self-insurance and the policy reforms 
that make it harder for a claim to be accepted.  In Chapter 2, I account for both of these 
changes to state WC systems.  Although no other paper considers the importance of self-
insurance, two papers examine the impact of some other WC policy reforms.  Using their 
subsample of approximately 3,000 injured workers in the NLSY, Ruser et al. (2004) also 
control for the policy changes that occurred in WC in the 1990s.  The authors focus on 
three types of policy changes: anti-fraud measures, policies that made it harder for claims 
to be awarded benefits—by either requiring objective medical evidence or limiting claims 
for injuries that aggravate a pre-existing medical condition, and reforms that gave 
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employers the right to choose the treating doctor.  However, they find no impact of the 
various policy changes on injury rates or claiming behavior.  This could arise because 
many of the reforms were expected to have the biggest impact on older workers, and the 
oldest in their sample was only 44.21   
 Boden and Ruser (2003) depart from the recent incidence literature by using 
aggregate data to estimate the determinants of workplace injuries rather than using 
individual data to examine WC claims.  The authors estimate the frequency of workplace 
injuries resulting in days away from work as a function of three types of policy changes: 
granting employers the choice of treating doctor, demanding objective medical evidence, 
and making it difficult to award compensation if the injury merely aggravates a pre-
existing condition.  In states that began to require objective medical evidence to support 
claims, they find that the frequency of workplace injuries fell.  However, the authors find 
no effect of two of the policy reforms—granting physician choice to the employer or 
making it difficult to be awarded compensation if the injury merely aggravates a pre-
existing condition.    These results may indicate workplace injuries are not responsive to 
these policy reforms, or they may reflect the importance of controlling for the individual 
characteristics that impact a worker’s decision to take risks on the job or claim WC (e.g., 
gender, marital status, age).   
 Results from Ruser et al. (2004) and Neuhauser and Raphael (2004) suggest 
worker responsiveness to benefit levels was lower in the 1990s than in the 1980s, but 
their estimates only consider the reporting effect because WC claim incidence is defined 
conditional on a workplace injury occurring.  In Chapter 2, I estimate a directly 
comparable elasticity of benefit receipt by directly updating Krueger (1990) for the 
                                                 
21 By definition, their sample fell between the ages of 14 and 22 in 1979. 
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1990s.  Using these data, I identify a critical sample restriction that is responsible for 
much of the difference in the Krueger (1990) and Hirsch et al. (1997) results.  I provide 
the first estimates concerning the impact of self-insurance on claim incidence and use a 
dataset better suited to estimating the impacts of the WC policy reforms in the 1990s.  
The sample size in the CPS is larger than the NLSY, includes older workers who are 
more likely to be impacted by the policies, and contains rich demographic characteristics 
that are related to the likelihood an individual files a claim.  These individual 
characteristics are not available in the aggregate industry-level data used by Boden and 
Ruser (2003). 
1.3.2 Duration of Workers’ Compensation Benefits 
A second strand of the WC literature considers claim duration, or the length of time a 
worker receives benefits.  The expected impact of more generous benefit levels on the 
length of time away from work (and receiving WC benefits) is ambiguous.  More 
generous benefits are expected to make injured workers continue to receive benefits for a 
longer period of time whereas evidence from the incidence literature suggests that more 
generous benefits encourage workers with less severe injuries to claim cash benefits.  
Adding these minor claims to the pool of cash benefit recipients might drive down the 
average length of time away from work.  Most of the papers examining the relationship 
between the duration of WC benefits and benefit levels examine a single state and exploit 
a similar natural experiment—an increase in the maximum benefit—as in Neuhauser and 
Raphael (2004).  The studies exploit variation over time in the benefit schedule and 
across workers of different earnings levels—comparing changes in duration for higher 
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earning workers impacted by the increase of the maximum with changes in duration for 
lower earning workers not impacted by the increase.     
 Neuhauser and Raphael (2004) use claims data from the state of California to 
examine how the duration of benefit receipt responds to changes in the benefit schedule 
that occurred in the 1990s, taking sample composition changes into account.  After 
correcting for sample composition changes, the authors find an estimated elasticity of 
duration with respect to benefits of .8.  Thus, the higher the benefit levels, the more time 
a claimant misses from work.  Failing to correct for these sample composition changes 
generates an estimated elasticity of .3.  An elasticity of .3 is much closer to the estimated 
duration elasticities found by Meyer et al. (1995) who use administrative claims data 
from Kentucky and Michigan to examine increases in maximum benefits that occurred in 
the early 1980s.  Using administrative claims data from Minnesota, Krueger (1991) also 
examines the impact of an increase in the maximum benefit level.  He finds that WC 
recipients are highly elastic; a ten percent increase in benefits leads to between a three 
and 17 percent increase in claim duration.22   
 Evidence Concerning Policy Changes from the 1990s 
The duration literature largely examines worker responsiveness to benefit levels.  Once a 
worker begins to receive cash benefits, it is plausible to assume that the other parties to 
the claim—the employer, insurer, and doctor—also influence duration.  Krueger (1991) 
also addresses important WC policy questions by considering the impact of self-
insurance on responsiveness to WC benefits.  Self-insured employers bear the full cost of 
each claim, so Krueger hypothesizes that self-insured employers may be more likely to 
                                                 
22 When Krueger does not take the nonlinearities in the WC benefit schedule into account, the elasticity is 
.279.  When accounting for the nonlinearities, it is 1.67.  Neither Neuhauser and Raphael (2004) nor Meyer 
et al. (1997) account for the nonlinearities in the benefit schedule. 
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speed return-to-work by offering modified work or more closely monitoring a worker’s 
recovery.  Krueger shows that duration is shorter for employees whose employer is self-
insured than for those whose employer is privately or publicly insured.  If self-insured 
employers successfully get injured workers back to their jobs quickly, then perhaps self-
insured employers also impact claim incidence, a question I address in Chapter 2.  
Krueger’s finding lends support to examining the impact of self-insurance on claim 
incidence, as in Chapter 2.  This result also illustrates that, with the right incentives, case 
management might impact WC claims, an assertion I examine in Chapter 3. 
 Using detailed claims information from the Workers’ Compensation Research 
Institute, Neumark et al. (2005) study how allowing the employer to choose the physician 
impacts the amount of time workers remain away from work.  The data represent claims 
from four states, Texas, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and California, and the authors 
find that workers miss 23 to 32 percent more time when the employee, not the employer, 
selects the treating physician.  The authors show that employees who choose new 
physicians drive this result.      
   In Chapter 3, I complement this strand of the duration literature by examining 
the impact of changing incentives to third-party case managers, as well as show the 
importance of considering the details of a policy reform and a state’s WC system.  With 
the rise in self-insurance and growth in contracting out for public programs, private case 
managers for WC proliferated.  In Chapter 3, I examine the impact of such case managers 
on WC claim duration and show that duration is responsive to case management—
implying a case manager is another important actor in a WC claim.  It would be 
impossible to identify or interpret the effect of these case managers without fully 
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understanding the state’s WC  program and the nuances of the policy reform.  Chapter 3 
shows how valuable it can be to delve into the details in a particular state to uncover the 
effects of the WC policy reforms. 
1.4 Conclusion 
In Chapter 2, I examine the question of incidence and update the estimated elasticity of 
benefit receipt.  I show that worker responsiveness to benefit levels fell, even when using 
the same methodology as Krueger (1990) and controlling for changes to WC in the 
1990s.  I also am able to attribute the differences in the Krueger (1990) and Hirsch et al. 
(1997) elasticities to different sample restriction criteria.  Consistent with the previous 
literature, I find no effect of the policy reforms characterized by Boden and Ruser (2003) 
and Ruser et al. (2004).  However, I do conclude that increased prevalence of self-
insurance impacted WC incidence. 
 In Chapter 3, I complement the duration literature and show how important case 
managers are to the length of a claim.  The analysis illustrates the importance of fully 
understanding WC in a particular state, which classifying reforms in a few categories 
obscures.  More generally, Chapter 3 provides additional evidence concerning the 
importance of structuring incentives and cautions public entities to consider strategic 
behavior when crafting such programs. 
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Tables for Chapter 1 
Table 1-1: Fraction of Workers with Earnings Exceeding the Maximum Benefit and State 







Fraction of Workers 
Whose Expected 






Panel A: States with Lowest Workers’ Compensation Maximum Weekly Benefit 
Mississippi 316.46 .50 .54 
Arizona 374.10 .27 .58 
Georgia 375 .54 .52 
Louisiana 388 .40 .58 
New York 400 .46 .54 
Kansas 401 .47 .55 
Arkansas 410 .36 .60 
Montana 439 .29 .60 
Idaho 445.50 .11 .74 
South Dakota 448 .33 .66 
    
    
Panel B: States with Highest Workers’ Compensation Maximum Weekly Benefit 
Pennsylvania 644 .23 .69 
Maryland 652 .22 .62 
Minnesota 750 .21 .64 
Vermont 760 .06 .70 
Indiana 762 .13 .65 
Massachusetts 830.89 .04 .63 
Washington 830.90 .16 .62 
New Hampshire 923 .12 .62 
District of Columbia 948.76 .20 .79 
Illinois 956.32 .12 .75 




Table 1-2: Injury Rates and Workforce Composition for 1-digit Industries, 1989, 1992, 
and 2001 
 Injury Incidence Rate Share of Workforce in Industry 
 1992 2001 1989 2001 
Mining .073 .040 .010 .009 
Construction .131 .079 .066 .069 
Manufacturing .125 .081 .259 .195 
Wholesale .076 .053 .050 .051 
Retail .087 .057 .182 .178 
FIRE .029 .018 .087 .083 
Services .071 .046 .269 .340 
 
Source: Injury rates for 1992: www.bls.gov/news.release/history/osh_121593.txt viewed 4/12/08; 
Injury rates for 2001: http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/osh/os/ostb1129.pdf, viewed 4/12/08; 
Industry composition: author’s calculations from CPS data 
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Alabama 1992    
Alaska 1992    
Arkansas 1993  1993  
Arizona 1994    
California 1993   1993 
Connecticut 1992 1993   
Florida   1994  
Georgia 1994    
Kansas   1993  
Kentucky 1994 1995 1996 1996 
Maine  1993   
Massachusetts  1992   
Michigan 1992    
Minnesota 1992 1993  1995 
Missouri 1992  1993  
Montana 1993 1993  1995 
Nebraska 1993    
Nevada  1994 1995  
New York 1996 1997   
North Carolina 1992    
North Dakota 1995   1995 
Ohio 1993 1997   
Oklahoma 1992 1995   
Oregon  1990 1990 1990 
Rhode Island 1992    
South Carolina 1994    
South Dakota   1995  
Tennessee 1996    
Virginia 1993    
Wyoming   1994  


































Figure 1-1: Schedule of Workers’ Compensation Cash Benefits (Temporary Total 
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Hirsch et al. (1997)
Author's calculations from Current Population Survey
Figure 1-4: Industry Composition, 1989 and 2001 
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Source: Author’s calculations from Current Population Survey. 
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Source: Author’s calculations from Current Population Survey; Expected Weekly Benefit 
































Figure 1-7: Total Medical and Cash Benefits Paid for Workers’ 































Source: National Academy for Social Insurance (2000 $) 
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Chapter 2: The Effect of Workers’ Compensation Cash Benefit 




During the 1990s, the incidence rate of Workers’ Compensation (WC) insurance 
claims fell.  In 1989, 1.4 percent of workers filed new claims, but in 2001 only .8 percent 
of workers filed new claims.  This decline could have arisen for any of the following 
three reasons: fewer injuries occurred, fewer injured workers received WC as 
compensation for a workplace injury, or there was a change in worker responsiveness to 
benefit levels.  Workplaces did become safer in the 1990s as injury rates dropped in all 
industries and workers moved to safer industries and occupations.  There were also 
nontrivial shifts in the WC system that made it harder for workplace injuries to result in 
WC benefits.  During the 1990s, many states enacted reforms that made it harder for an 
injured worker to be awarded WC benefits, and there was an increase in the share of 
benefits covered by self-insured employers.   
There is suggestive evidence showing a decline in worker responsiveness to 
benefit levels (Ruser et al. (2004) and Neuhauser and Raphael (2004)).  However, these 
estimates for the 1990s are not directly comparable to the widely cited estimated 
elasticities for the 1980s (Krueger (1990) and Hirsch et al. (1997)), so it is unclear if 
worker responsiveness changed or the results differ because of different methodologies.  
The Ruser et al. (2004) and Neuhauser and Raphael (2004) estimates for the 1990s 
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examine WC cash benefit incidence conditional on a workplace injury occurring whereas 
Krueger (1990) and Hirsch et al. (1997) do not make that same restriction.   
In this chapter, I provide results that are directly comparable to those from the 
1980s.  I control for shifts in the composition of the workforce and improvements in 
workplace safety.  I also control for the different changes to WC systems that impacted 
the likelihood a claim would be accepted—the different policy reforms and the increased 
prevalence of self-insurance.  It is important to control for these changes to WC to obtain 
an unbiased estimate of the relationship between claim incidence and benefit levels.  
Furthermore, estimates of the impact of the changes to WC on claiming behavior are 
interesting in their own right, and I present the first estimates of the role of self-insurance 
on benefit claiming. 
 The estimated elasticity of WC benefit receipt is lower than that found by Krueger 
(1990) for the 1980s, and is consistent with the other estimates for the 1990s.  I find 
higher rates of self-insurance are negatively correlated with WC receipt, but the other 
changes to WC in the 1990s had no impact on claims.  Finally, I reconcile why the 
estimated elasticities for the 1980s presented by Krueger (1990) and Hirsch et al. (1997) 
differ. 
 
2.2 Relationship Between Benefit Levels and WC Claiming 
Higher benefit levels may lead to higher WC claim rates in two possible ways.  First, as 
Krueger (1990) develops, when benefits are higher, workers may take more risks.  Under 
the assumption that it is costly to take safety precautions at work, the higher the WC 
benefits, the fewer precautions the worker will take.  In this case, moral hazard leads to 
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an increase in injuries, medical only claims, and cash benefit claims.  Furthermore, the 
WC cash benefit incidence rate might rise in response to an increase in benefits even if 
the injury rate does not change because of a “reporting effect.”23  Workers with less 
severe injuries who otherwise would return to work before one week—the amount of 
time a worker must miss to claim cash benefits—may instead remain out of work long 
enough to claim cash benefits if benefit levels are higher.  In this chapter, I examine the 
incidence of cash benefit receipt.   
 The previously published estimated elasticities from the 1990s (Ruser et al. 
(2004), Neuhauser and Raphael (2004)) are not directly comparable with those from the 
1980s (Krueger (1990), Hirsch et al. (1997)) because the estimates for the 1990s only 
examine the reporting effect whereas those from the 1980s consider both moral hazard 
and reporting effects.  In this chapter, I directly update the estimates from the 1980s 
which quantify increases in WC claiming that result from either an increase in injuries or 
reporting. 
 
2.3 Workplace Injuries and WC in the 1990s 
In all likelihood, increased workplace safety contributed to the decline in the incidence 
rate because during the 1990s, workplaces became safer.  Table 1-2 contains the injury 
rates for each industry in 1992 and 2001, and the injury rate fell in every industry.  For 
example, in 1992 there were 12.5 injuries per 100 manufacturing workers whereas in 
2001 there were only 8.1 injuries per 100 workers.24  Moreover, during the 1990s the 
composition of the workforce shifted to safer industries.  Columns (3) and (4) contain the 
                                                 
23 For theoretical development of this assertion, see Krueger (1990) and Ruser et al. (2004). 
24 1992 was the earliest year of data available. 
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share of the workforce in each industry in 1989 and 2001, respectively.  The biggest 
shifts in employment are away from manufacturing, one of the most dangerous industries, 
and toward services, one of the safest industries.  In addition to these improvements in 
workplace safety, other changes to WC in the 1990s might also have played a role in 
reducing the WC incidence rate. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, two-thirds of all states enacted some type of reform to 
their WC systems in the 1990s.  Some of these reforms were expected to impact the 
incidence of WC receipt whereas others attempted to reduce the amount of time injured 
workers miss from their jobs.  In this chapter, I focus on the extensive margin and the 
changes to WC that were expected to reduce the incidence of WC receipt.  Boden and 
Ruser (2003) and Ruser et al. (2004) characterize the policy reforms using four 
categories, as shown in Table 1-3.   
First, many states enacted stiff penalties for employees found guilty of filing a 
fraudulent claim.  Other reforms made it harder for filed claims to be accepted.  Several 
states granted employers the privilege of selecting which doctor treats a workplace injury 
or limited a doctor’s ability to designate an injury as work-related.  Since doctors serve as 
gatekeepers to the WC system, employers will likely choose physicians who are expected 
to be more conservative about what they consider a valid workplace injury.  Some states 
began to require that injured workers and their doctors provide objective medical 
evidence to prove the existence of a workplace injury, making it more difficult for injured 
workers to receive WC for common, soft-tissue injuries such as back pain and carpal 
tunnel syndrome.  Several states also made it harder for workers to be awarded 
compensation if the workplace injury aggravated a pre-existing condition, and this 
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especially impacted older workers who are more likely to suffer from other conditions 
(Burton and Spieler, 2001).   
Oregon was the first state to pass major WC reforms.  The legislative changes 
were effective in 1990 and gave Oregon employers the right to choose the treating doctor, 
required injured workers and their doctors to provide objective medical evidence, and 
made it much harder for workers to get compensation for injuries that merely aggravated 
a pre-existing condition.   The bulk of the legislation went into effect in 1992 and 1993, 
and the two most common reforms were implementing anti-fraud measures and granting 
employers the right to select which doctor will treat the injury.   
Another response to rising WC employer costs was the shift towards self-
insurance.  As shown in Figure 1-9, between 1987 and 1995, the share of benefits 
covered by self-insurance increased by 40 percent.  If an employer self-insures for WC, 
the employer bears all of the risk of a given claim, so employers that self-insure are 
expected to expend more effort getting injured workers back on the job.  In his theoretical 
development, Krueger (1990) shows an employer’s incentive to invest in workplace 
safety or discourage WC claims rises with an employer’s level of experience rating, and 
self-insured employers are perfectly experience rated.  Therefore, as more employers 
turned to self-insurance in the 1990s, more employers had an incentive to discourage 
claims completely or prevent medical-only claims from progressing to cash benefit 
claims.  When estimating the relationship between benefit levels and WC receipt, it will 
be important to control for these improvements in workplace safety and changes to the 
WC system.  My estimates will also provide insight into the impact of these changes on 





Krueger (1990) was the first to use individual level data to analyze the impact of 
increased benefit generosity on the WC incidence rate.  Using Current Population Survey 
(CPS) data matched for 1983/1984 and 1984/1985, the estimated elasticity of incidence 
with respect to benefits is .74 when controlling for worker characteristics, state, year, 
industry, and occupation.  That is, a ten percent increase in benefits leads to a 7.4 percent 
increase in the incidence rate.  This result is higher than previous results from aggregate 
data and other results from individual level data.25 
 Hirsch, Macpherson, and DuMond (1997) update Krueger’s work to include 
union membership and use additional years of the CPS from 1977 through 1992.  Union 
members may be more responsive to WC benefit levels than non-union workers if unions 
make workers more aware of WC filing procedures and offer workplace protections to 
employees who file claims.  Since union members are also paid higher wages (and 
awarded higher benefits) than non-union members, omitting a control for union 
membership will impose an upward bias on the coefficient describing the impact of 
benefits on WC receipt.  Similar to Krueger (1990), the authors find a positive and 
significant relationship between benefit levels and the WC incidence rate.  However, the 
estimated elasticity is approximately .18, much lower than the .74 estimated by Krueger 
(1990).   
                                                 
25 Estimated elasticities from aggregate data range from .116 to .708 (e.g., see Bartel and Thomas (1985); 
Butler and Worrall (1983); Chelius (1982); Chelius and Kavanaugh (1988); and Ruser (1985)) and other 
estimates from individual data range from .18 and .58 (e.g., see Hirsch et al. (1997); Neuhauser and 
Raphael (2004); Ruser et al. (2004)). 
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 Hirsch et al. (1997) note that when they use the same years of data as Krueger 
(1990), the estimated elasticity is much higher than for their full sample, suggesting the 
discrepancy between the two estimated elasticities is driven by Krueger’s small sample of 
unrepresentative years.   While this may be true, another important difference between 
the two papers could contribute to the different elasticities.  Both authors compute the 
expected WC benefit using each state’s parameters, and in most states this is 
straightforward because an injured worker’s WC benefit is equal to 2/3 of his or her pre-
injury earnings, subject to a maximum benefit level.  In some states, however, benefits 
are a function of a worker’s post-tax earnings, and constructing post-tax earnings requires 
several assumptions about deductions and exemptions.  Excluding states where benefits 
are a function of post-tax earnings reduces the noise in the benefits variable.  Hirsch et al. 
(1997) include all 50 states in their analysis whereas Krueger (1990) excludes those states 
in which WC benefits are a function of post-tax earnings.     
 The main contribution of this chapter is to provide an updated estimated elasticity 
of benefit receipt.  Previously published estimated elasticities for the 1990s are not 
directly comparable to Krueger (1990) or Hirsch at al. (1997) because they define claim 
incidence differently.  Using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth—1979, Ruser et 
al. (2004) find that conditional on suffering a workplace injury, a ten percent increase in 
benefit levels increases the claim rate by 5.8 percent.  Using California administrative 
claims data, Neuhauser and Raphael (2004) find a benefit claiming elasticity around .5, 
conditional on receiving medical benefits.  That is, a ten percent increase in benefits 
makes injured workers who receive WC medical care five percent more likely to claim 
cash benefits.  Together, these results suggest worker responsiveness declined, and I will 
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be able to confirm this assertion by directly replicating Krueger (1990) using data from 
the 1990s. 
 
2.5 Data and Econometric Approach 
2.5.1 Data 
To estimate the elasticity of WC receipt with respect to benefit levels, I pooled individual 
data from successive CPS’s for the years 1989 through 2001.  Following Krueger (1990) 
and Hirsch et al. (1997), I match individuals in successive years so that I can identify the 
incidence of WC receipt.26  By observing individuals two years in a row, I am able to 
identify those individuals who did not receive WC in year t-1.  Therefore, I identify new 
cases of WC as transitions to WC in year t.  I am able to match individuals in successive 
years because respondents in the CPS are included for four months, excluded for eight 
months, and then return to the survey for another four months, making it possible to 
match many March respondents two years in a row.  Over this time period, the CPS does 
not contain individual identifiers, so to match March respondents from one year to the 
next, I use household identifiers and confirm that the individual’s age, race, and sex are 
consistent in both periods, following Madrian and Lefgren (1999).27  The CPS changed 
the methodology used to construct household identifiers between 1994 and 1995, 
excluding 1994/1995.  The extent of these matching restrictions is shown in Table 2-1, 
                                                 
26 I use the matching programs available from the National Bureau of Economic Research and described in 
Madrian and Lefgren (1999). 
27 I only kept individuals whose sex and race matched exactly in t and t-1.  I allowed age to vary; I kept 
individuals with age differences between one and three years.  At first glance, this range allowed for age 
may seem too broad, but two simple examples show it is reasonable.  For March birthdays, age could vary 
as little as 0 years if in year t-1 the survey was administered after their birthday but in year t it was given 
before their birthday.  Age could also vary as much as two years if the survey was administered before the 
birthday in t but after the birthday in t-1. 
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and I am able to match over two-thirds of the 843,674 individuals eligible to be matched 
across years.   
The March CPS asks respondents questions about the year preceding the survey, 
so the matched March 1989/March 1990 CPS contains information about individuals in 
1988 and 1989.  The sample is comprised of civilian, non-institutionalized individuals 
ages 18 through 65 who worked at least one week in year t-1, and were employed in the 
private sector.  To identify new cases of WC receipt in year t, I also restrict the sample to 
workers who did not receive any WC benefits in year t-1.  I exclude individuals who 
worked in the agriculture or domestic services industries, sectors which are not likely to 
be covered by workers compensation, and drop railroad workers, longshoremen, harbor 
workers, and seamen because they are likely to be covered under the federal programs. 
Finally, following Krueger (1990), I exclude individuals who live in states where 
benefits are computed from after-tax earnings at any point between 1988 and 2002 
because accurately describing their after tax weekly wage requires many assumptions 
about deductions and exemptions.  This restriction drops workers from Alaska, the 
District of Columbia, Iowa, Michigan, Connecticut, Maine, and Rhode Island.  The final 
sample includes 166,686 individuals. 
 
2.5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2-2 contains descriptive statistics about WC receipt and the workers who claim 
WC.  In column (1), I characterize the full sample, and show that 1.1 percent of all 
eligible workers receive WC.  In columns (2) and (3), I present corresponding descriptive 
statistics for workers who receive WC and those who do not, respectively.  Using each 
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state’s parameters for WC receipt, I compute the expected weekly WC benefit for each 
worker.28  WC recipients face slightly lower expected weekly benefits, $331 per week, 
whereas those who do not receive benefits face expected benefits of $337 per week.  This 
seems contrary to the result that individuals are more likely to claim WC when benefits 
are higher; however, those results hold earnings constant.29  WC recipients earn less than 
non-recipients; WC recipients earn an average of $562 per week whereas non-recipients 
earn approximately $661.  To characterize benefit generosity relative to earnings, 
consider the replacement rate—the ratio of benefits to earnings.  Though the difference is 
not statistically significant, the replacement rate for WC recipients is .651, versus .647 for 
non-recipients.  Since WC benefits are not taxed, it is also important to control for a 
worker’s marginal tax rate to capture the effective replacement rate of benefits.  For each 
family, I construct a marginal tax rate on earnings in year t-1 using the internet TAXSIM 
program provided by the NBER.  As expected, WC recipients, who also have lower 
earnings, have lower marginal tax rates.   
 Hirsch et al. (1997) demonstrate the importance of considering union 
membership.  Unions may make workers more aware of WC filling procedures and offer 
workplace protections to employees who file claims.  As was true in the 1980s, WC 
recipients are more likely to be union members.  Over six percent of all WC recipients 
                                                 
28 I use the relevant year’s parameters, as captured in the Analysis of Workers’ Compensation Laws, 
considering dependents in the household in year t.  Parameters were unavailable for 1997, so I linearly 
interpolated the parameters from 1996 and 1998.  I verified the results are robust to excluding all 1997 
observations. 
29 This relationship differs from Krueger’s analysis where recipients receive higher benefits.  This change 
between the early 1980s and the 1990s likely reflects the increase in income inequality.  Workers in the 
right hand tail of the income distribution claim WC benefits at a much lower rate than workers at lower 
points in the income distribution.  Since income grew more for families at the top of the income 
distribution, benefits are a function of earnings, and high earners claim WC at much lower rates than 
workers in the middle of the distribution, it follows that expected WC benefits will be higher for non-
recipients.  Furthermore, when considering workers whose earnings fall below the 90th percentile, expected 
benefits for recipients are $322 per week versus $314 per week for non-recipients. 
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are union members, compared with 2.5 percent of non-recipients.  As shown in Figure 2-
1, union membership declined slightly during the 1990s.30  If unions do make WC more 
accessible, then declining rates of unionization might also have contributed to the falling 
incidence rate. 
In this analysis, I consider two types of changes to WC: the policy reforms of the 
1990s and the increase in self-insurance.  Over half of all workers live in a state that 
passed WC reform during the 1990s, and most of these workers are observed in reform 
states after the policies are in effect.  I also consider the changes in the prevalence of self-
insurance and find workers live in states where a little over one-fifth of benefits are paid 
by self-insuring employers, on average.   
 Some jobs are inherently safer than others, and as shown in Table 2-3, WC 
recipients are much more likely than non-recipients to work in more dangerous 
occupations such as craft worker, operator, transportation worker, or laborer.  Similarly, 
WC recipients are much more likely to work in dangerous industries such as 
manufacturing and construction.  The demographic characteristics of WC recipients are 
consistent with these industry and occupation characteristics.  WC recipients have lower 
levels of education, and a larger share of recipients are male, .59 versus .52 in the full 
sample.   
 Next I examine the correlation between the changes to WC that occurred during 
this time period and WC receipt.  In Table 2-4, column (1) contains descriptive statistics 
for workers in states that passed policy reforms and column (2) contains characteristics of 
workers in states that did not enact reform.  Reform states have less generous benefits, 
                                                 




lower rates of union membership, and a higher share of benefits covered by self-
insurance.  In columns (4) and (5), I compare reform states before and after reforms were 
in effect.  These descriptive statistics provide the first suggestive evidence that the 
policies impacted incidence.  After the passage of the WC reform, the incidence rate fell 
from .0131 to .0113.  The benefit replacement rate fell once the reforms were in place, 
suggesting the reforms are correlated with benefit generosity.  Neglecting to control for 
these policy reforms is expected to exert an upward bias on the coefficient on benefits.  
In this chapter, I consider three different types of policy reforms: anti-fraud measures, 
employer choice of doctor, and policies that make it harder to qualify for cash benefits.  
In column (5) I show that of the workers impacted by one of the reforms, 62 percent 
faced anti-fraud measures in contrast with 38 percent of workers losing the right to 
choose their physician and 36 percent impacted by policies that demanded stricter 
medical criteria. 
 The trends in self-insurance presented in Figure 1-9 show that, throughout the 
1990s, the share of benefits covered by self-insurance rose from 1987 to 1994 and then 
fell slightly.  If self-insuring employers are able to make it harder for workers to claim 
WC, then when the prevalence of self-insurance rises (falls), the incidence rate is 
expected to fall (rise).  In Table 2-5, I show how WC receipt changed in response to an 
increase or decrease in the share of benefits covered by self-insurance.  The incidence 
rate is 1.2 in the year before the share covered by self-insurance increases and then falls 
to 1.0, and this difference in means is statistically significant at the ten percent level.  In 
contrast, there is no significant change in the incidence rate after the share of self-
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insurance falls.  These descriptive statistics provide suggestive evidence that changes to 
WC in the 1990s impacted claim incidence. 
 
2.5.3 Methodology 
I first directly replicate Krueger (1990) and estimate a probit model of the following 
form: 
 )(),,,|1Pr( ,,,,,,,,,, λαθβ sttsitsisttsitsitsi STXGSTXGWC +++Φ==   (1) 
where i references the individual, s the state, and t the year.  Let G represent benefit 
generosity (log benefits, log weekly earnings, and the worker’s marginal tax rate), and the 
coefficient of interest is )(BenLnβ , the coefficient on log benefits.  The vector X contains 
demographic characteristics about the worker (gender, age, race, marital status, and level 
of education).  I also include industry and occupation effects to control for job safety.  
The vector T contains year effects to capture shifts in claiming behavior between 1989 
and 2001 that are common to all workers.  Since WC is a state-level program, it varies 
widely across states and it is difficult to completely capture these differences in the 
parameters Ln(Benefits), Ln(Earnings), and marginal tax rate.  Therefore, in the vector S 
I include state effects to capture any underlying differences across states in the incidence 
of WC receipt.  This specification directly updates Krueger (1990) for the 1990s, and 











,                        (2) 
This parsimonious specification omits union status, controls for policy reforms, and self-
insurance—factors which impact WC receipt.  Yatchew and Griliches (1985) provide a 
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framework to predict how omitting these factors will impact the probit estimates. Since 
union members have higher wages, they have higher expected benefits, and union 
members also have higher rates of benefit claiming.  Therefore, omitting union 
membership exerts an upward bias on the coefficient estimate for )(BenLnβ , and by 
including union membership the estimated elasticity is expected to fall, as is found in 
Hirsch et al. (1997).  I test this prediction with: 
)(),,,,|1Pr( ,,,,,,,,,, κλαθβ isttsitsiisttsitsitsi USTXGUSTXGWC ++++Φ==           (3) 
where U=1 if the worker belonged to a union in t-1.   
The policies that make it harder for an individual to be awarded benefits are also 
expected to impact the estimated elasticity of WC receipt.  I include controls for the three 
different types of policy reforms, and the share of benefits covered by self-insurance, in 











      (4) 
Expected benefits and rates of WC receipt are lower in states that have enacted policies, 
implying that the estimate for )(BenLnβ should fall when the policy controls are included.   
2.6 Empirical Results 
Column (1) of Table 2-6a contains the results from directly updating Krueger (1990).  I 
present marginal effects with the z-statistic in parentheses.31  As in Krueger (1990), I find 
a positive, statistically significant relationship between Ln(Benefits) and WC receipt.  
Increasing benefits by one percent increases the probability the average worker claims 
                                                 
31 For continuous variables, marginal effects are taken at the mean value of all variables and for binary 




WC by .4 percentage points.  In contrast, increasing earnings or the marginal tax rate 
decreases the probability a worker claims WC.  Table 2-6b also shows the marginal 
effects associated with different occupations and industries (laborers are the omitted 
occupation and manufacturing is the omitted industry).  As expected, laborers face a 
higher probability of WC receipt than managers, professional, sales, clerical, or service 
workers.  In contrast, laborers are less likely to receive WC than craft workers, operators, 
and transportation workers.  Workers in the mining and manufacturing industries are also 
the most likely to receive WC. 
 The estimated elasticity of WC receipt is .489.  That is, a ten percent increase in 
benefits corresponds to a 4.9 percent increase in WC incidence.  This value is smaller 
than the .74 elasticity estimated by Krueger (1990).  This parsimonious specification is 
expected to generate an upper bound estimate because including union status and the 
changes to WC is expected to lower the estimate for )(BenLnβ .  This decline in the 
estimated elasticity could arise if there is a true decline in worker responsiveness to 
benefit levels or there is some shift in responsiveness I am unable to capture with the 
observed data.  This estimate of .49 is close to the previously published estimates of .5 
and .58 found by Ruser et al. (2004) and Neuhauser and Raphael (2004).   
 In column (2), I include a measure of union status.  This specification approaches 
Hirsch et al. (1997) and I also find a positive and statistically significant impact of union 
membership on WC claiming.  As expected, the estimated benefit elasticity falls, but only 
slightly, from .4887 to .4865.  However, this estimated elasticity of .4864 is still much 
larger than the .18 estimated by Hirsch et al. (1997).   
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The sample is constructed using the criteria described in Krueger (1990).  In 
columns (1) and (2), I exclude workers who live in a state which computes benefits as a 
function of post-tax earnings, and the estimated elasticities of approximately .49 are 
lower than the .74 estimated by Krueger.32  This suggests worker responsiveness in the 
1990s was lower than in the 1980s.  As an additional test, I construct a sample that I can 
directly compare to Hirsch et al. (1997).  In columns (3) and (4), I include workers from 
all states, no matter how benefits are computed, but exclude workers who held more than 
one job in year t-1.33   The authors assume workers holding only one job in year t were in 
the same job the previous year, when information about union membership was reported.  
In columns (3) and (4) I present estimates of equations (1) and (3) using the sample 
restrictions in Hirsch et al. (1997) and find estimated elasticities of .09, much lower than 
their .18 estimate.34   
 In Table 2-6b, I present marginal effects for the remaining demographic 
characteristics.  As is true in the WC literature, conditional on industry and occupation, 
men have lower rates of WC receipt.  Workers with lower levels of education are more 
likely to receive WC and single workers are less likely to claim. 
2.6.1 Policy Reforms 
If the policy reforms impacted a worker’s propensity to claim WC benefits, and the 
reforms are correlated with benefit levels, then the estimates in Table 2-6a are biased.  
Therefore, in Table 2-7 I include controls for the policy changes.  I first include an 
indicator variable that equals one after the policy is in effect and consider each type of 
                                                 
32 Following Krueger (1990), I also exclude workers younger than age 18. 
33 Following Hirsch et al. (1997), I include workers younger than age 18. 
34 In results not presented here, I ascertain that excluding states that construct benefits as a function of post-
tax earnings is the restriction responsible for the vast difference in the Krueger and Hirsch et al. results. 
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policy separately.  None of the policies has a substantively or statistically significant 
impact on WC receipt and the benefit elasticity changes only slightly across the columns, 
ranging from .4847 to .4871.  The policies may have an additive effect, so in column (5) I 
include indicators for each policy and again see little change in the estimated elasticity, 
which is now .4881.  Again, none of the policy variables is significant, and they are not 
jointly significant.  If WC claiming declines because passing reforms changes the tone of 
the state’s WC system, then it is important to identify when the first policy change 
occurred in a state, as in column (6).  The indicator “any policy” equals one every year 
after the first policy is implemented.  As in the other specifications, this policy effect is 
small in magnitude, not statistically significant, and does not change the benefit elasticity 
much (.4857). 
 Simply identifying the policies with an indicator variable, as in Table 2-7, does 
not allow for lagged effects of a policy change nor does it control for any increased rate 
of claiming in the years leading up to the reform.  Therefore, in Table 2-8 I characterize 
the reforms with a series of indicator variables identifying the two years before the policy 
is in effect, the year of implementation, and the three plus years after it is in place.  
Again, I include each type of policy separately in columns (2) through (4) and the 
complete set of leads and lags in column (5).  As in Table 2-7, the marginal effects of the 
policy variables are small in magnitude, rarely statistically significant, and not jointly 
significant.  Furthermore, the estimated benefit elasticity is largely invariant to the 
inclusion of these different controls; it now ranges from .4856 to .4954.  This result could 
arise if the policies have no effect on claiming behavior, if the policies are categorized 
incorrectly, or are included with the wrong functional form. 
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 This result is consistent with the previous literature which has not found an 
impact of these four categories of policy reforms on WC claims.  Ruser et al. (2004) find 
no impact of policies to reduce fraud and suggest these policies might have little or no 
impact because they assert “… very few cases of fraudulent worker behavior have been 
alleged.”  The second class of reforms I examine, those that make it harder for an injury 
to qualify for WC, are expected to have the most impact on older workers so it may be 
difficult to find an effect when considering workers of all ages (Burton and Spieler, 
2001).  Therefore, in results not presented here I restrict attention to those workers ages 
45 and older, and I still find the policies have no effect.  The final type of policy reform I 
study is granting the employer the right to choose the doctor, and as Neumark et al. 
(2005) show, this is expected to have modest effects.  Neumark et al. (2005) find that 
claims are more expensive and last longer only when workers choose a new doctor, and 
that this happens only rarely.  Their sample is restricted to cash benefit recipients and 
their analysis focuses on the intensive margin—the cost of cash benefit claims and the 
length of time workers receive benefits.  Depending on the timing of when injured 
workers seek a new doctor, there may not be any expected impact on the extensive 
margin, whether a worker claims benefits or not.   
2.6.2 Self-Insurance 
Although I find no evidence in support of the policy changes affecting WC claim 
incidence, I also consider another change to WC which occurred in the 1990s—the 
increased prevalence of self-insurance.  In the CPS, I cannot observe which workers are 
employed by self-insuring employers, so I control for self-insurance with the share of 
benefits paid by self-insuring employers in the worker’s state that year.  Workers in states 
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with higher shares of benefits paid by self-insurance have a higher probability of working 
for a self-insuring employer.  If self-insured employers are more successful at lowering 
the cost of claims, the higher the share of benefits paid by self-insuring employer, the 
lower the probability a worker will file a WC claim.  These data are only available 
beginning in 1992, so in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2-9, I first reproduce the baseline 
estimates for the years 1992 through 2001.  I find little difference in the marginal effects 
or the estimated elasticity when I exclude the years 1989 to 1991. 
In column (3), I include the share of benefits in a state that are covered by self-
insurance.  The marginal effect is negative, as expected, (-.010) but it is not statistically 
significant.  In column (4) I include all of the policy variables as well as the share of self-
insurance.  The marginal effect implies that increasing the share of self-insurance by one 
percentage point (or 4.4 percent from a base of .228) reduces the probability a worker 
claims WC by .8 percentage points, or 73 percent.  This effect seems implausibly large 
but is consistent with previous findings for self-insured versus privately insured firms.  
Among self-insured employers, Krueger (1991) finds a negative relationship between 
benefit levels and the length of claims. 
Self-insurance is more prevalent in some industries than others.  For example, 
manufacturing has a high rate of self-insurance, so changes in the share of benefits paid 
by self-insuring employers are likely driven by manufacturers.  In column (5) , I allow 
the effect of self-insurance to vary by whether or not a worker is in the manufacturing 
industry.  Consistent with expectations, I find a negative and statistically significant 
impact of the effect of self-insurance on the incidence rate for manufacturing workers, the 
marginal effect is -.0136.  I also find a smaller, also negative, but not statistically 
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significant impact on the incidence rate for workers in the balance of industries, the 
marginal effect is -.007.  Although these results imply that incidence rates fell when the 
prevalence of self-insurance rises, the estimated elasticity remains relatively unchanged 
(.5038). 
2.6.3 Accounting for Changes in Injury Rates 
The lower estimated elasticity for the 1990s might arise if there was a decline in worker 
responsiveness, or if the relationship is still be mis-specified.  As shown in Table 1-2, 
there were two important shifts in workplace safety that might also impact the WC 
incidence rate.  During the 1990s, the workforce shifted to safer industries and injury 
rates fell in every industry.  However, the injury rate did not fall uniformly across all 
industries.  By including time-invariant industry effects and industry-invariant year 
effects, the specification is not flexible enough to capture the differential decline in injury 
rates across industry.  In results not shown here, I add industry-by-year effects and 
continue to find an estimated elasticity of approximately .5.  Thus, the estimate of .5 is 
robust to being much more flexible about changes in workplace safety. 
2.7 Conclusion 
The incidence rate for WC fell dramatically in the 1990s.  Workplaces became safer 
because injury rates dropped and the workforce shifted to safer industries and 
occupations.  During the 1990s several changes to the WC system may also have 
impacted WC claiming.  In this chapter, I examine worker responsiveness to benefit 
levels controlling for these changes in the workplace and state WC programs.   
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 I estimate a much lower elasticity of WC receipt with respect to benefits in the 
1990s, approximately .5.  I find this estimated elasticity is robust to including controls for 
WC policy reforms, the prevalence of self-insurance, and declining injury rates by 
industry.  Consistent with previously published estimates for the 1990s, this suggests a 
decline in worker responsiveness to benefit levels in the 1990s (Neuhauser and Raphael 
(2004), and Ruser et al. (2004)).  In future work, I will include additional years of data, 
back to 1977, encompassing the time covered by both Krueger (1990) and Hirsch et al. 
(1997).  Using the expanded data, I will replicate their results and verify that the 
differences in elasticity are due to the changes in the 1990s and not my estimation 
approach. 
 I also produced estimates of the effect of the policy reforms and increased 
prevalence of self-insurance on WC claims.  Estimated impacts for the policy reforms are 
small in magnitude and not statistically significant.  This result might arise if the policies 
truly have no impact on claiming or if characterizing reforms in this way obscures 
important nuances in a state’s WC system.  In Chapter 3, I analyze the impact of a policy 
reform that occurred in the state of Ohio in the mid-1990s.  By focusing on one state, I 
am able to identify the different incentives inherent in the policy change.  The coefficient 
estimate on the share of benefits covered by self-insurance is negative and implies that 
workplace climate, not statewide policies, have the most bearing on an individual’s 
decision to claim WC.  In Chapter 3, I examine a policy change intended to motivate 
employers and case managers to keep WC costs down.
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Tables for Chapter 2 
 
Table 2-1: Sample Construction 
Individuals in March CPS, 1989-2001 1,711,981 
  
Observed in year t-1 843,674 
  
Merged with subsequent year 549,826 
  
Ages 18-64 332,039 
  
Individual is a civilian and does not live in group quarters 331,216 
  
Worked at least one week in year t-1 267,734 
  
Employed in private sector 198,390 
  
Wage was at least $2.00 per hour 195,067 
  
Did not receive WC in year t-1 192,249 
  
Exclude railroad, domestic, agricultural, and longshore workers as well as 
workers employed in farm, forestry, and fishing occupations 
185,948 
  


























 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
WC receipt .011 1 0  
















     
Replacement rate .65 .65 .65 .69 
     
Maximum benefit in state 








     
Marginal tax rate .25 .23 .25 6.73 
     
Union membership .026 .062 .025 9.87 
     
Live in state that enacted 
WC reform 
.568 .579 .568 1.05 
     
Impacted by WC reform .513 .516 .513 .27 
     
Share of benefits covered 
by self-insurance (92-01) 
.228 .232 .228 1.65 
     













Workers who do 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) 








     
Male .52 .59 .52 5.82 
     
High school degree .37 .49 .37 10.33 
     
Some college .28 .25 .28 2.91 
     
College or more .23 .09 .28 15.43 
     
Black .08 .09 .08 .99 
     
Hispanic, Other .11 .12 .11 .47 
4     
Single .22 .18 .22 3.94 
     
Occupation:     
Manager .15 .06 .15 10.54 
     
Professional .15 .08 .15 9.27 
     
Sales .14 .09 .14 6.26 
     
Clerical .16 .11 .16 5.81 
     
Service .11 .12 .11 1.38 
     
Craft .13 .22 .12 12.83 
     
Operator .08 .15 .08 10.69 
     
Transportation .04 .11 .04 13.75 
     
Laborer .04 .06 .07 4.29 
     
Industry:     
Mining .01 .017 .01 3.18 
     
Construction .06 .096 .06 5.69 
     
Retail .19 .174 .19 1.65 
     
Wholesale .05 .045 .05 .92 
     
FIRE .08 .043 .08 6.32 
     
Services .31 .221 .31 8.21 
     
Manufacturing .22 .30 .22 8.19 
     
N 166,686 1,876 164,810  
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Table 2-4: Descriptive Statistics, Workers’ Compensation (WC) Policy Reforms 
    State Enacts 
Reform 
 




























Col (4) = 
Col (5) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
WC receipt .011 .011 1.05 .0131 .0113 1.49 




















       
Replacement rate .67 .63 35.07 .65 .62 7.99 
       
Maximum 











       
Marginal tax rate .24 .25 19.73 .25 .25 .16 
       
Union 
membership 
.027 .025 2.51 .028 .025 1.74 
       
Share of benefits 
covered by self-
insurance (92-01) 
.19 .257 130 .259 .256 2.68 
       
       
Exposure to Policy Reforms:      
      
Anti-fraud measures   .62  
       
Employer chooses doctor   .38  
       
Stricter medical criteria   .36  
       
N 72,088 94,598  9,100 85,498  
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Table 2-5: Workers’ Compensation (WC) Receipt Before and After Large Changes in 
Prevalence of Self-Insurance 














decline in self- 
insurance 
      
WC receipt .012 .010  .009 .010 
      
N 26,295 24,944  24,916 27,799 
Note: Consider increases or decreases greater in magnitude than five percent 
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Table 2-6a: Factors Impacting Workers’ Compensation (WC) Receipt, Marginal Effects 
from Probit (z-statistics in parentheses) 
   Restrictions Used in Hirsch et 
al. (1997) 













































































































































State Dummies 44 44 50 50 
N 166,686 166,686 163,413 163,413 
Pseudo R2 .049 .050 .051 .051 
Benefit Elasticity .4887 .4865 .0924 .0909 
Earnings Elasticity -.2166 -.2259 .1121 .1037 
Omitted occupation is laborer; omitted industry is manufacturing.  Each specification includes 11 year 
effects and controls for race and ethnicity.  Remaining demographic controls are presented in Table 2-6b.  
Following Hirsch et al. (1997), in columns (3) and (4) I exclude workers who held more than one job in 




Table 2-6b: Factors Impacting Workers’ Compensation Receipt, Marginal Effects from 
Probit (z-statistics in parentheses) 
   Restrictions Used in Hirsch et al. 
(1997) 


















     








     








     

















     
N 166,686 166,686 163,413 163,413 
     
Pseudo R2 .049 .050 .051 .051 
     
Benefit Elasticity .4887 .4864 .0924 .0909 
     
Earnings Elasticity -.2166 -.2259 .1121 .1037 
See notes to Table 2-6a. 
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Table 2-7: Factors Impacting Workers’ Compensation Receipt, Controlling for Policy 
Reforms 




























































       

















  -.0005 
(.52) 
 
       
Stricter Medical 
Criteria 





       
Employer 
Chooses Doctor 





       
Any Policy      .0005 
(.69) 
       
N 166,686 166,686 166,686 166,686 166,686 166,686 
       
Pseudo R2 .050 .0502 .0503 .0502 .0503 .0502 
       
Benefit Elasticity .4865 .4871 .4847 .4868 .4881 .4857 
       
Wage Elasticity -.2259 -.2263 -.2249 -.2261 -.2273 -.2253 
Each specification also includes controls for industry, occupation, gender, age, marital status, 
education, race and ethnicity, 11 year effects and 44 state effects.  
 
60 
Table 2-8: Factors Impacting Workers’ Compensation Receipt, Controlling for Lags and 
Leads of Policy Reforms; Marginal effects from probit, z statistic in parentheses 































      










      










      









      









      







      









      









      
Third year and 









      
N 166,686 166,686 166,686 166,686 166,686 
      
Pseudo R2 .0502 .0505 .0504 .0503 .0507 
      
Benefit Elasticity .4865 .4930 .4856 .4896 .4954 
      
Wage Elasticity -.2259 -.2297 -.2257 -.2281 -.2321 
Each specification also includes controls for industry, occupation, gender, age, marital status, 
education, race and ethnicity, 11 year effects and 44 state effects.   
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Table 2-9: Factors Impacting Workers’ Compensation Receipt, 1992-2001, Controlling 
for Share of Benefits Paid by Self-Insured Employers;  











































      










      










      
Share Benefits Covered by 
Self- Insurance  





      
Share Self-insurance * Work 
in Manufacturing Industry 
    -.0136 
(1.96) 
      
Share Self-Insurance * Do not 
Work in Manufacturing 
    -.007 
(1.08) 
      
N 122,875 122,875 122,875 122,875 122,875 
      
Pseudo R2 .0526 .0534 .0527 .0535 .0530 
      
Benefit Elasticity .4950 .4999 .4898 .4952 .5045 
      
Wage Elasticity -.2533 -.2564 -.2507 -.2544 -.2615 
Each specification also includes controls for industry, occupation, gender, age, marital status, 
education, race and ethnicity, 8 year effects and 44 state effects.  
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Figures for Chapter 2 
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Source: Author’s calculations from Current Population Survey 
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Chapter 3: The Impact of Incentives to Reduce Workers’ 




Classifying WC policy reforms into different categories obscures important details about 
state WC programs and the nuances of different policies.  In this chapter I examine one 
reform enacted by the state of Ohio, one of five states in which employers must purchase 
WC insurance from the state (or self-insure).  In response to rising employer costs, the 
state contracted out WC case management responsibilities to companies called Third-
Party Case Managers (TCMs) with the hope that, as private companies, TCMs might be 
able to get injured workers back on the job more efficiently than if the state continued to 
manage WC claims.35  To be clear, in this chapter I am considering the impact of a policy 
change on the intensive margin, or how long an injured worker remains away from work, 
and not the extensive margin, the decision of whether or not to claim WC. 
The term “case management” refers to an insurer’s efforts to get an injured 
worker back on the job sooner through innovations such as coordinating with employers 
to accommodate the claimant, lobbying for doctors to release claimants to modified work, 
and by encouraging injured workers to go back to their jobs in an attempt to reduce moral 
hazard.  If there are economies of scale to effectively implementing these approaches, 
TCMs that manage many claims should be more successful than individual employers in 
reducing the amount of time workers miss from their jobs.   
                                                 
35 In Ohio and the larger WC community, TCMs are referred to as Managed Care Organizations (MCOs); 
however, I refer to them as TCMs to avoid confusion with health insurance MCOs, which are structured 
differently.   
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Two years after the TCMs were introduced in Ohio, the state incorporated a bonus 
incentive payment intended to reward the TCMs for getting injured workers back on the 
job sooner.  The impact of this bonus payment on claim duration is the focus of this 
paper.  The exact structure of the payment is quite intricate, but it is essentially a 
decreasing function of the average days away from work for claims meeting two criteria.  
First, the state selected a subset of detailed injuries to “incentivize,” so a claim is only 
included in the payment calculation if the worker is diagnosed with one of the 
“incentivized” injuries.  The incentivized injuries were chosen because they represent 
medical conditions for which a guideline number of days away from work could be 
identified.  Second, a claim having an incentivized injury is excluded from the calculation 
of average days away from work if the injured worker does not return to his or her job 
within 15 months.  As a result of this provision, the policy does not penalize TCMs for a 
particularly bad draw of claims.  However, it gives TCMs a perverse incentive to actually 
increase duration for some claims with incentivized injuries so that the claimants miss 
more than 15 months and are then excluded from the calculation of average days away 
from work used to compute the bonus payment.   
Therefore, the structure of the bonus payment suggests that a profit-maximizing 
TCM will react with heterogeneous responses as a claim develops over time.  It takes an 
average of seven days after an injury for a TCM to learn of the claim from the doctor.  So 
if the injured worker returns to work before one week passes, the TCM does not intervene 
on the claim and has no response to the incentive structure of the program.  If the injured 
worker is still away from work when the TCM learns of the claim, the case manager will 
initially attempt to get the injured worker back on the job as soon as possible.  The case 
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manager will continue to endeavor to expedite return-to-work until the claim extends 
long enough that the claimant could feasibly remain out of work past 15 months.  At this 
point, it is profitable for the TCM to extend the claim beyond 15 months so that it is 
excluded from the bonus payment calculation.  One possible way a case manager might 
extend a claim is by enrolling the injured worker in vocational rehabilitation, a mix of 
lengthy programs that re-train claimants for the workplace.   
I find TCMs were quite responsive to the bonus payment; within three calendar 
quarters of its implementation, three-quarters of all TCMs received the bonus payment.  
To test whether the TCMs maximized the bonus payment by attempting to reduce 
duration for moderately severe claims and increasing duration for severe claims, I 
acquired administrative claims data for all claims occurring between 1995 and 2002.  I 
use the variation in the implementation of these policies over time and across injury to 
determine whether or not the policy changes have any impact on claim duration.  The 
structure of the payment suggests the bonus will not have any effect on the most minor 
claims because these claimants return to work before the TCM becomes involved, and 
this is confirmed in the data.  The case managers are predicted to successfully reduce 
duration for those claimants having moderately severe injuries because as soon as claims 
are filed, the injured workers are exposed to an aggressive return-to-work campaign.  
Although I find no evidence that the bonus induces duration to decrease, results from 
quantile regression confirm that duration does not increase for these claims.   
Duration is predicted to increase for claimants with severe injuries because claims 
lasting longer than 15 months are excluded from the calculation of the bonus payment.  I 
test for this response in several ways and conclude the bonus increases duration for 
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severe claims with incentivized injuries.  Restricting attention to severe claims, I find that 
the bonus increases average days away from work by about three weeks for claims 
having incentivized injuries.  Quantile regression results confirm these increases are 
concentrated at the top of the conditional distribution of claim duration.  I verify that this 
corresponds to the predicted strategic behavior on the part of the TCMs because the 
probability a claim spans more than 15 months rises by 30 percent for claims having an 
incentivized injury.  Thus, the bonus actually leads to an increase in days away from 
work among the most severe claims.  In WC, the most severe claims comprise a 
disproportionate share of program costs.  Therefore, this increase in days away from 
work among the most expensive claims suggests the intended reduction in employer costs 
was not realized.   
With the Ohio administrative data, I am able to test one mechanism that case 
managers may use to influence claimants to remain out of work past 15 months—
enrollment in vocational rehabilitation programs.  I calculate that participants begin to 
receive vocational rehabilitation an average of ten months after their injury and the 
rehabilitation programs last over six months.  On average, the timing of the program is 
consistent with its use as a method to strategically increase duration past 15 months.  
Furthermore, benefits paid for vocational rehabilitation do not impact an employer’s 
premiums and several TCMs have a second financial incentive to enroll injured workers 
in vocational rehabilitation.  Six of the largest TCMs are subsidiaries of companies that 
also own rehabilitation providers.36  By enrolling injured workers in vocational 
                                                 
36 Before the privatization of WC, these services were provided by the state.  Private WC vocational 
rehabilitation providers were formed after the implementation of TCMs.  Paynter, Bob.  October 26, 2006.  
“Big money to be made in referrals for rehab; Rehab, Managed-care system for Workers’ Comp hurt the 
workers, critics say.”  Cleveland Plain Dealer, A1.     
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rehabilitation, the TCM can maximize the bonus payment and the rehabilitation company 
receives business from the state.  Consistent with this prediction, I find that after the 
bonus is in place, claims having incentivized injuries are nearly fifty percent more likely 
to receive vocational rehabilitation benefits.  Thus, the bonus appears to have a 
measurable impact on days away from work in ways consistent with a profit-maximizing 
TCM responding to the bonus payment.   
The impact of the bonus payment on the duration of claims having an incentivized 
injury is the focus of this paper, but I also estimate the overall effect of TCMs because it 
is possible that the simple act of contracting out services impacted claim duration.  When 
the TCMs were first introduced, they were mandated to provide insurance cards to all 
employers whose claims they managed.  This infrastructure change may have influenced 
claim duration by getting injured workers to their first doctor’s appointment sooner, with 
the biggest impact expected to accrue to individuals with minor injuries.  To quantify 
this, I must assume that the introduction of TCMs was the only change to duration in 
Ohio between 1995 and 2002, an assumption that is unlikely to hold.  Nevertheless, I find 
that after the TCMs began operation average duration fell for all minor claims, even if the 
claim had a non-incentivized injury.  In total, although contracting out services to TCMs 
modestly reduces days away from work for the majority of minor claimants, the net result 
of the bonus payment is an overall increase in days away from work.  Using reasonable 
assumptions about the amount paid in cash benefits and the value of a worker’s 
productivity, I estimate the bonus payment may cost the state between $26.4 and $39.4 
million per year. 
 
68 
3.2 Third-Party Case Managers and the Bonus Payment 
3.2.1 Third-Party Case Managers and Ohio 
Third-Party Case Managers are private companies that assume WC case management 
responsibilities.  These companies are used nationwide to reduce employer costs by 
facilitating return-to-work for injured workers; the companies are especially popular 
among employers that self-insure WC because they eliminate the need for in-house 
claims management.37  In Ohio, TCMs are currently managing every claim insured by the 
state.38  The TCMs were implemented in Ohio in two phases, as shown in Figure 3-1. In 
1997, the state contracted out case management services to TCMs in hopes of curbing 
employer costs.39  Case management involves medically managing claims and expediting 
return-to-work.40  After the introduction of TCMs in Ohio, injured workers, employers, 
and doctors no longer interact with the state.  The second policy change, and the main 
focus of this paper, was the incorporation of a bonus payment intended to reward the 
TCMs for reducing claim duration. 
 The TCMs began operation in 1997, and by the beginning of 2007 there were 27 
TCMs in Ohio, with four of them managing 70 percent of claims (Ohio Bureau of 
Workers’ Compensation, 2006).41  Employers continue to pay premiums to the state but 
                                                 
37 For example, Blue Cross Blue Shield advertises a Third-Party Administration Plan to self-insured 
employers in Florida.  http://www.bcbsfl.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=WORKERSCOMP.selfInsured, 
viewed 9/24/07.  Ryder System Inc. is an example of a self-insuring employer that sought to hire nurses to 
manage claims.  Quint, Michael.  “Crackdown on Job-Injury Costs.”  The New York Times, March 16, 
1995.  Section D, Page 1, Column 2.   
38 Several other states, such as Tennessee and Texas, mandate the use of formalized case management, but 
do not require that third parties manage the cases.   
39The legislation was passed in 1993. 
40 In Ohio, medical management of a claim consists of filing the claim with the state, providing initial 
approval of requested medical procedures, and directing state reimbursement to medical providers. 




select which TCM will manage their claims during open enrollment every two years.42  
During this intermediate period before the return-to-work bonus payment was 
implemented, the state compensated TCMs as a function of the share of total premiums 
managed by the TCM.43  Beginning in 1999, the state incorporated a bonus payment that 
was a decreasing function of average days away from work for some claims.44  
 The TCMs are mandated to provide insurance cards to every employer whose 
claims they manage.  After an injured worker informs his or her employer of the injury, 
the employer gives the injured worker a TCM insurance card identifying which TCM 
manages the claim.  An injured worker then receives care from any doctor of his or her 
choice.  The TCM insurance card informs the doctor’s office where to file the claim and 
submit the bill.  The introduction of these insurance cards alone may streamline the path 
between injury and the first doctor’s appointment, and this may reduce average duration 
for all minor claims, whether or not the claim has an incentivized injury.  The doctor 
makes a diagnosis and assesses if the injury is work-related.  The physician then reports 
the claim to the employer’s chosen TCM.  The TCM learns of the claim after an average 
of seven days, reports the claim to the state, and assigns the claim to a case manager 
(Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, 2006).45  At this point, the case manager is 
required to contact the doctor, the employer, and the injured worker to manage the claim 
and acquire the necessary information to verify the injury and confirm it is work-
related.46   
                                                 
42 2006 MCO Agreement.  Acquired from a public records request.  Chapter 1, page 43. 
43 Donchess, Joel, Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, personal communication, April 24, 2007. 
44 2006 MCO Agreement.  Acquired from a public records request.  Appendix E.   
45 Case managers are often nurses. 
46 Information from each party is required for the TCM to file the claim with the state.  2006 MCO 
Agreement.  Acquired from a public records request.  Chapter 2, page 10.   
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After these contacts, the case manager might attempt to reduce claim duration.  
According to individuals at some of Ohio’s largest TCMs, the organizations use three 
strategies to decrease days away from work.  First, case managers encourage aggressive 
medical treatment, in which workers are treated and returned to work as soon as possible.  
Second, the case managers monitor injured workers in an effort to get the claimants to 
return to work sooner and reduce moral hazard.  Third, case managers encourage 
employers to accommodate injured workers on the job.47  
 At each medical appointment for a work-related injury, the doctor fills out a form 
identifying the activities the claimant is released to do on the job.  Within the restrictions 
outlined on this form, the case manager helps the employer identify ways the injured 
worker might be useful in the workplace.  For example, a nurse’s aide who suffers from a 
back injury might be released to do seated work that does not require lifting more than 
ten pounds, such as folding towels or performing clerical duties.48  The case manager also 
monitors injured workers and encourages them to return to work.  If the claimants cannot 
return to their former positions, the TCM might advocate vocational rehabilitation 
benefits.  When workers receive vocational rehabilitation, they receive career counseling, 
assessment, and training.49  
 
3.2.2 The Return-to-Work Bonus Payment 
Two years after the TCMs were implemented, the state restructured TCM compensation 
to incorporate a performance-based component, the bonus payment.  The bonus was 
                                                 
47 Curry, D., GatesMcDonald, personal communication, August 11, 2006. 
Kafiti, Anthony.  888-OHIOCOMP, personal communication, August 14, 2006. 
48 The worker may work fewer hours or be paid a lower wage if he or she cannot work at full capacity. 
49 Paynter, Bob.  October 26, 2006.  “Big money to be made in referrals to rehab; Rehab, managed-care 
system for Workers’ Comp hurts the workers, critics say.”  Cleveland Plain Dealer, A1. 
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intended to reward TCMs for effectively reducing claim duration.50  It is paid each 
quarter and is essentially a decreasing function of average days away from work for 
eligible claims, subject to a maximum amount.  The bonus payment comprises over forty 
percent of TCM compensation, and in FY 2004, the TCMs earned approximately $70 
million in bonus payments (Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, n.d.). 51  Figure 3-2 
depicts the share of TCMs receiving the bonus payment in each quarter since its 
inception.  As is clear from the figure, TCMs responded to the incentives inherent in the 
program.  The solid line depicts the share of TCMs receiving any bonus payment, and the 
dashed line plots the share of TCMs receiving the full bonus payment.  Within three 
calendar quarters, nearly all TCMs began to receive some bonus payment, and over half 
of all TCMs received the maximum amount.   
A claim must meet two criteria to be included in the calculation of days away 
from work for the bonus payment.  The injured worker must have been diagnosed with an 
incentivized injury and the injured worker must return to his or her job within 15 months.  
Five-digit ICD-9 codes are the detailed injury codes used internationally by doctors to 
diagnose patients.52  Some of these codes correspond to common workplace injuries for 
which it is straightforward to identify a goal or benchmark number of days away from 
work.  For example, it is much easier to identify optimal duration for injured workers 
suffering from superficial cuts than for traumatic head injuries.53  Therefore, to facilitate 
                                                 
50 The TCMs were aware that the structure of compensation would incorporate a performance-based 
component, but the exact structure of the bonus payment was not known to TCMs until 1999.  The state 
waited two years to implement this incentive payment to give the TCMs a chance to adjust to the process of 
managing claims. 
51 2006 MCO Agreement.  Appendix E, page 13.  Acquired from a public records request.   
52 The codes are so detailed that at least 22 codes describe pain in the back or neck.   
53These benchmarks are not available through public records requests from the state because they are 
proprietary.  They were derived from Milliman and Robertson, Healthcare Management Guidelines, 
Volume 7.     
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performance-based evaluation of TCMs with different injury mixes, the state chose to 
incentivize 266 detailed ICD-9 codes with well-defined benchmarks.  Only claims having 
one of these diagnoses or injuries are included in the calculation of the bonus payment.54  
In Table 3-1, I present detailed injury codes by incentivized status for the 20 most 
common injuries in each category.  This table shows the level of detail of the injury codes 
and that many types of injuries are common to both groups, such as back sprains, bruises, 
and cuts.   
Claims also must meet a second criterion to be included in the bonus payment.  A 
claim having an incentivized injury will be excluded from the calculation if the injured 
worker does not return to work within 15 months.55  This provision effectively shelters 
TCMs from a particularly bad draw of claims, but also creates a perverse incentive for 
TCMs to increase the duration of some claims to ensure they are not included in the 
calculation of the bonus payment.  Suppose a is the mean days away from work for the 
claims used to compute a TCM’s bonus payment and b is the mean of the benchmarks 
corresponding to these injuries.  The bonus payment is a decreasing function of a-b.  The 
lower a TCM’s actual experience (a) is relative to the goal for that TCM (b), the higher 
the bonus payment.56  Therefore, a TCM can lower mean days away from work (a) by 
                                                 
54 The conditions were also selected because there were enough claims for each injury prior to the incentive 
implementation to construct the mean number of days missed by workers having such conditions. 
55 In practice, the incentive is more complex as it is based on quarters of the calendar year, reflecting the 
return-to-work experience of the previous five quarters.  For example, the incentive payment for Q1 in 
2007 is based on spells that began and ended between Q4 2005 and Q4 2006.  Consider injuries occurring 
in Q4 2005; these injuries must return to work before January 1, 2007 to be included in the incentive 
payment.  Thus, an injury occurring on October 1, 2005 must miss 15 months of work before it is excluded 
from the average calculation.  In contrast, an injury occurring on December 31, 2005 must only miss 12 
months of work before being excluded from the calculation.  I refer to this provision as “15 months” for 
simplicity but incorporate this complexity in my empirical work. 
56 To be precise, the incentive=max(0,f[(a-b)/(c-b)]) where a=actual average days away from work, 
b=average benchmark days away from work, c=average counterfactual days away from work, and f is a 
decreasing function of [(a-b)/(c-b)].  Each quarter, the average days away from work is are computed for 
those claims that have one of the “incentivized” conditions and began and ended within the past 15 months.  
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ensuring those claims that could feasibly result in a loss of more than 15 months of work 
in fact remain out of work so long they are not included in the bonus payment.   
 
3.3 Expected TCM Responses and the Expected Impact on Days Away from Work 
3.3.1 Expected Impact of the Introduction of TCMS (no Bonus Payment) 
Recall that when the TCMs were first implemented, TCM compensation was strictly a 
function of the share of total premiums the TCM managed.  Under this condition, a 
profit-maximizing TCM might be expected to reduce claim duration in order to remain 
attractive to employers.  If a TCM successfully returns injured workers to their jobs, 
premiums for experience-rated employers will fall.  However, there are two reasons 
employers may not have responded to TCM performance by switching to TCMs with 
better return-to-work outcomes.   
First, Ohio employers were insulated from the full impact of their loss histories.  
After an extended period of rising employer costs in Ohio, the state insurer had 
unexpected excess reserves during the time of these policy reforms.  The state chose to 
return this surplus to employers in the form of large premium rebates.  Between July 1, 
1997 and December 31, 2002, employers were eligible for premium rebates of at least 75 
percent.57  Thus, even the premiums paid by the most dangerous employers were greatly 
reduced, overshadowing any impact the TCM may have had on premiums.  Second, 
employers may have had a difficult time evaluating and differentiating between TCMs.  
                                                                                                                                                 
The state also computes that quarter’s average of the corresponding benchmark (b) and counterfactual (c) 
days away from work for the injuries included in that quarter’s payment. 
57 Personal Communication, Elizabeth Bravender, Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, August 3, 
2006.  In 1998, employers received an even larger refund. 
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Although the state publishes analyses describing TCM performance to better help 
employers select among TCMs, few employers have much interaction with their selected 
TCMs.  Most employers have fewer than ten claims per year, and about 80 percent of 
these claims are resolved before the TCM becomes involved.  For this reason, the bulk of 
employers may not have been compelled to switch TCMs, and maintaining employer 
clients was unlikely to have been an important aspect of the TCM profit function during 
this period.  Using Ohio administrative claims data, I calculate that fewer than ten percent 
of employers switch TCMs each year, providing further support for this claim.  
Therefore, I assume that the marginal benefit to a TCM for reducing a claim’s duration 
during this period is near zero.  
 Given the infrastructure changes mandated by the state, the structure of TCM 
compensation, and employer behavior, the impact of the TCM on claim duration is 
predicted to change as a claim develops from the date of injury.  To illustrate this, I make 
a few simplifying assumptions.  First, I assume that every claim in the TCMs portfolio 
was injured on the same day.  I also assume that when a TCM decides whether or not to 
attempt to reduce duration, the TCM makes the decision to act considering the entire 
portfolio of claims.  I make this assumption because it is difficult to predict a claim’s 
duration, especially early in the claim.  Suppose case managers make calls each week, 
then each week the case manager assesses whether the marginal benefit of calling the 
entire portfolio of claims outweighs the marginal cost of these calls.   
 In Figure 3-3a, I illustrate the marginal costs and benefits associated with 
reducing duration.  The horizontal axis measures time away from work if the TCM 
attempts to reduce duration, called dRED.  There are no marginal costs or benefits 
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associated with the first week a worker misses of work because the TCM cannot impact 
duration before the claim is filed.58  For claims that would return to work within one 
week, only infrastructure changes, such as insurance cards, can influence duration.  These 
infrastructure changes may have streamlined the path to the first doctor’s appointment 
and reduced duration.  Therefore, duration is predicted to decrease for minor claims.  For 
claims lasting longer than one week, the marginal cost of reducing claim duration always 
exceeds the marginal benefit because of the assumption that maintaining employer clients 
was not an important component of a TCMs profit function.  Thus, before the bonus was 
implemented, case managers had no incentive to influence claim duration above and 
beyond the impact of infrastructure changes such as insurance cards. 
 
3.3.2 Expected Impact of the Bonus Payment on Incentivized Injuries 
After the second policy change, the introduction of the bonus payment, TCMs may 
respond by affecting claim duration or by influencing doctors to strategically re-label 
injuries as incentivized or non-incentivized.  Although strategic re-labeling is present in 
response to other public programs (e.g., Dafny, 2005; Fisman and Wei, 2004; and 
Silverman and Skinner, 2004), I do not expect to find such a reaction to the bonus 
payment.  A doctor diagnoses an injured worker before the claim is even filed with the 
TCM.  For strategic re-labeling to be successful, TCMs would have to convince doctors 
to comply even though the doctors do not directly benefit from a higher bonus payment.  
In Appendix A, I examine strategic re-labeling and confirm that doctors do not appear to 
                                                 
58 I assume that providing insurance cards incurs a small, fixed cost. 
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be manipulating claims in this way.  Therefore, I focus on the incentives facing TCMs to 
impact days away from work.   
The bonus payment is predicted to impact claim duration differentially for claims 
having incentivized and non-incentivized injuries.  The case managers are predicted to 
treat claims with non-incentivized injuries in the same way before and after the bonus 
payment is implemented (Figure 3-3a).  For claims having incentivized injuries, recall 
that the bonus is essentially a decreasing function of average days away from work for 
claimants that return to work in less than 15 months.  Therefore, the structure of the 
bonus suggests that a profit-maximizing TCM will react with heterogeneous responses as 
a claim develops over time.  These actions correspond to changes in duration that vary by 
a claim’s underlying severity.   
 Figure 3-3b characterizes the marginal costs and benefits associated with reducing 
claim duration for incentivized injuries once the bonus payment is in place.  As in Figure 
3-3a, there are no marginal costs or benefits before claims are filed in the first week after 
injury.  Once the TCM learns of the injury, the marginal cost of reducing duration 
remains the same—the cost of a phone call.  However, the marginal benefit now exceeds 
the marginal cost because the bonus payment is a function of duration for injured workers 
having incentivized injuries.  In a given week, the marginal benefit to the TCM for claim 
reduction efforts is the change in the bonus payment that arises from workers returning to 
their jobs that week instead of when they would have returned in the absence of any 
intervention.  The marginal benefit falls over time because the bonus is a decreasing 
function of average days away from work.  When the TCM first learns of the claim, the 
marginal benefit to a TCM of reducing duration exceeds the marginal cost of these 
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efforts.  Therefore, claimants are exposed to an aggressive return-to-work campaign after 
one week away from work.  A characteristic of many TCM data management systems 
suggests case managers can focus these efforts on claimants with incentivized injuries.  In 
many TCMs, the data management system used to track claims informs the case 
managers whether the claim has an incentivized injury, the injury’s goal days away from 
work, and the amount of time since the injury.59 
Recall that claims that extend longer than 15 months are excluded from the bonus 
payment.  Thus, there is a threshold beyond which it benefits TCMs to encourage 
claimants to remain out of work past 15 months.  A TCM might do this in two ways: 
actively increase a claim’s duration or ignore the claimant in the hope that the worker 
will return to the job once 15 months have passed.60  To illustrate this point, I define two 
additional measures of duration for each worker.  Recall dRED quantifies the number of 
days a worker misses if the TCM attempts to reduce duration.  If the TCM does not 
intervene at all, a claim’s duration is given by dOH, which can be thought of as the 
counterfactual or amount of time the injured worker would have missed if the injury had 
occurred when the state of Ohio managed claims.  If the TCM attempts to make an 
injured worker remain out of work longer, the claim would miss dLONG days away from 
work.  The TCM is predicted to actively increase duration for claims with incentivized 
injuries having dLONG>15 months, the threshold beyond which TCMs benefit if the 
claimant remains out of work past 15 months.  The case manager might use enrollment in 
                                                 
59 Ohio Employee Health Partnership.  http://www.systoc.com/Tracker/Summer99/DoDM.htm viewed 
8/12/06 
Lori Newhouse, CareWorks, personal communication, August 18, 2006. 
60 The TCM has an incentive to identify these claims and not invest in reducing duration, but this is difficult 
to do.  Therefore, the case manager may unsuccessfully attempt to get these claimants back to work early in 
the claim.   
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vocational rehabilitation to increase duration for these claims.  Furthermore, TCMs have 
a second financial incentive to enroll injured workers in vocational rehabilitation 
programs; the largest TCMs are subsidiaries of companies that also own vocational 
rehabilitation providers.   
Some injured workers will miss more than 15 months of work even if the TCM 
does not attempt to make the claim longer (dOH>15 months), so the TCM does not need to 
actively increase duration for these claims.  However, these claims are difficult to 
identify so it is an empirical question whether or not the TCM actively works to increase 
duration for all claims past the threshold beyond which TCMs benefit if the claimant 
remains out of work past 15 months or ignores some claims—those that will miss 15 
months no matter what the TCM does.  I explore this matter in the empirical section.  The 
five largest TCMs and their affiliated vocational rehabilitation providers are CareWorks 
(VocWorks), CompManagement HealthSystems (Integrated Benefits Management), 
GatesMcDonald HealthPlus (unnamed affiliate), Sheakley Unicomp (Parman Group), and 
1800OHIOCOMP (VocRehab One).61   
 
3.3.3 Literature 
Although no previous study addresses this link between TCMs and claim duration, 
evidence from other work suggests that TCMs should be effective in impacting claim 
duration.  In order to bring claimants back to work sooner, the case managers work with 
employers to accommodate injured workers on the job.  There is evidence showing that 
                                                 
61 Paynter, Bob.  October 26, 2006.  “Big money to be made in referrals for rehab; Rehab, Managed-Care 
system for Workers’ Comp hurt the workers, critics say.”  Cleveland Plain Dealer, A1.  The unnamed 
affiliate of GatesMcDonald HealthPlus is referenced at www.gmcdhealthplus.com/HealthPlus/employer-
services.jsp#vocational-rehab.  Viewed May 21, 2008. 
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employer efforts to provide modified work or light duty to a recovering worker 
successfully reduce claim duration.  Using administrative claims data from Minnesota, 
Krueger (1991) shows that duration is shorter for employees whose employer is self-
insured than for those whose employer is privately or publicly insured.  Self-insured 
employers bear the full cost of each claim, so Krueger hypothesizes that self-insured 
employers are more likely to speed return-to-work by offering modified work or more 
closely monitoring a worker’s recovery.  This result suggests that case managers could 
successfully reduce claim duration by facilitating return-to-work with employers. 
If return-to-work efforts are unsuccessful, and the claim has exceeded the 
threshold beyond which it benefits the TCM for the claim to miss more than 15 months of 
work, the TCM may attempt to increase duration.  A case manager might successfully 
extend a claim past 15 months by enrolling claimants in lengthy vocational rehabilitation 
programs.  For this mechanism to be effective, the injured workers must choose to 
participate in the program.  Aakvik and Kjerstad (2003) estimate the determinants of 
participation in Norwegian vocational rehabilitation programs.  They find displaced 
workers are more likely to participate in vocational rehabilitation programs if the 
individual is eligible for cash benefits while receiving the training and the individual was 
employed the year before vocational rehabilitation was offered.  If the relationship 
between cash benefits, program timing, and participation in vocational rehabilitation is 
similar for Ohio injured workers, these results suggest case managers will be able to 
successfully enroll injured workers in lengthy rehabilitation programs.  In Ohio, injured 
workers continue to receive cash benefits while in vocational rehabilitation.  
Furthermore, if a case manager uses vocational rehabilitation to ensure claimants remain 
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away from work for more than 15 months, the injured worker needs to begin the 
rehabilitation program approximately one year after injury. 
 The case manager may simply ignore those claimants that would miss more than 
15 months in the absence of TCM intervention and allow them to remain away from 
work past 15 months.  For this to be effective, the TCM relies on the assumption that 
injured workers will continue to remain away from work if allowed to do so.  The WC 
literature has established that claims are responsive to benefit levels.  As confirmed in 
Chapter 2, when benefits become more generous, injured workers are more likely to 
claim cash benefits (Bronchetti, 2007; Hirsch et al.  1997; Krueger, 1990; Neuhauser and 
Raphael, 2004; Ruser et al., 2004; and Ruser, 1985) and receive those benefits longer 
(Butler and Worrall, 1985; Krueger, 1991; Meyer et al., 1995; and Neuhauser and 
Raphael, 2004).  Although the magnitude of the elasticity is sensitive to the dataset used 
as well as to the specification, it is always positive, providing evidence that workers 
respond to incentives.  This result suggests some claimants might willingly remain out of 
work until 15 months pass, lending support for the hypothesis that the case manager will 
be able to ignore these particularly severe claims until they extend to the point they are 
excluded from the calculation of the bonus payment.   
 
 
3.4 Data and Econometric Approach 
3.4.1 Data Description 
To assess the impact of the bonus payment intended to reduce WC claim duration, I have 
acquired administrative claims data from the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, 
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the state insurer.  The dataset includes information on all injuries occurring between 
January 1, 1995 and June 30, 2002 and follows each claim for three years.  For each 
claim, the dataset contains information on days away from work, the diagnosis for the 
injury (five-digit ICD-9 code), demographic characteristics (age, sex, and marital status), 
job characteristics (1-digit industry and 1-digit occupation), and identifiers for the 
employer and the TCM.  I exclude observations that are missing data or where the injured 
worker received a death benefit, permanent disability award, or lump-sum settlement 
within three years of the injury.62  The extent of these sample restrictions on the data is 
shown in the first six rows of Table 3-2. 
I also drop claims that are missing return-to-work information.  This exclusion 
demands careful treatment because it differentially impacts medical only claims, those 
claims that return to work within one week and do not receive cash benefits.  For 
claimants receiving cash benefit payments, the state maintains a complete transaction 
history that details each cash payment made to a claim.  This file quantifies the type of 
payment made and the dates covered by each check.  I assume cash benefit claimants 
return to work when benefits cease.63  Between 42.8 and 44.3 percent of cash benefit 
claims having incentivized injuries are missing return-to-work information, and this 
information is missing for between 48.8 and 51.9 percent of non-incentivized injuries 
                                                 
62 By law, claimants awarded either permanent death or total disability benefits are excluded from the 
incentive calculation.  2006 MCO Agreement.  Chapter 2, page 54.  Claims receiving permanent partial 
disability benefits or lump sum settlements are excluded because receipt of these benefits does not depend 
on whether or not an individual is working.  Therefore, I cannot infer when the injured worker returned to 
work. 
63 This is a nontrivial assumption, but it is confirmed in the data.  For 94 percent of cash benefit claimants, I 
have two sources of return-to-work information.  In addition to the complete transaction history of all cash 
benefit payments, recipients also appear in a file of return-to-work dates (1.3 percent are assumed to be 
censored because they receive benefits continuously for five years and return-to-work dates are missing for 
the remaining 5 percent).  For 81 percent of those cash benefit claimants with both sources of information, 
the return-to-work date is the same as that constructed by the cessation of benefits.  Furthermore, the main 
results of the paper are upheld when I drop those non-censored cash benefit claimants missing return-to-
work information or whose information is incongruent.     
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(see Appendix B).  Thus, the rate of missing data for cash benefit claimants is roughly 
constant over the three time periods and assumed to be missing at random.64   
In contrast, instances of medical only claims missing return-to-work information 
pose a much more nuanced problem for analyzing the impact of the bonus payment on 
days away from work.  By definition, medical only recipients never receive cash benefit 
checks, so a separate file captures the date each worker actually returns to his or her job.  
Before the implementation of the bonus, the state insurer simply needed to verify 
claimants did not miss more than one week of work.  After the bonus was put in place, it 
became much more important for the state to capture return-to-work information for 
medical only claims with incentivized injuries because the days away from work for these 
claims were now used to calculate the bonus payment.  Consistent with these incentives, 
the share of medical only claims with incentivized injuries missing return-to-work data 
fell once the bonus is in place (from 56.9 percent to 9.3 percent).  In contrast, the 
corresponding decline among non-incentivized injuries was somewhat smaller.  Before 
the bonus was in place, 57.6 percent of medical only claims having non-incentivized 
injuries were missing return-to-work data.  Once the bonus was implemented, the share 
of these claims that were missing data fell to 11.8 percent, a slightly smaller reduction.  
Return-to-work information is not missing at random for medical only claims.  Failing to 
account for this non-randomness would result in a sample of claims comprised of 
relatively more medical only claims.  Since medical only claims are shorter in duration, 
the changing sample composition will drive a mechanical decline in days away from 
                                                 
64 I selected a random sample of claims and compared them with the OH BWC database to confirm that 
return-to-work information is complete for the claims reporting it, but missing at random, at least based on 
observables about the injured worker and the injury, for claims without any return-to-work information.   
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work in the empirical results.  Therefore, I weight all results by the inverse probability 
that a claim has valid return-to-work information.65  
 I make the final two restrictions so that the different specifications are 
computationally feasible.  Claims are preserved only if the injury designation appears in 
each of the three time periods (before the TCM is introduced, once the TCM is managing 
claims but before the bonus is implemented, and the period when the TCM and bonus are 
both in place).  This restriction effectively accomplishes two things; it drops the injuries 
with the fewest number of claims and ensures the sample of injuries is the same in each 
period. 66  I further restrict the sample to those injuries that have more than 100 claims in 
each period.67  The final baseline sample has 491,533 observations.   
 
3.4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3-3 contains descriptive statistics for the outcome of interest, days away from 
work, separately for claims with incentivized injuries (treatment group) and non-
incentivized injuries (comparison group).  The first panel contains results for the full 
sample of injuries.  The first striking thing about this comparison is that average duration 
is quite different for the two groups.  Claimants having non-incentivized injuries return to 
work in an average of about four days.  This is much more quickly than average return-
                                                 
65 I estimated the probability a claim has valid return-to-work information using a linear probability model 
where the dependent variable is equal to one if an observation has valid return-to-work information.  The 
controls include demographic characteristics, employer controls, TCM fixed effects, and injury indicators.  
These covariates are allowed to vary by (1) whether or not the claim has an incentivized injury, (2) when 
the injury occurred (PRE, POST1, POST2), and (3) whether or not the claim received medical only or cash 
benefits.  Claims with valid return-to-work information are preserved in the final sample and weighted by 
the inverse of the predicted probability a claim has valid duration information.   
66 There are 599 diagnosis codes with fewer than three claims.  By definition, this restriction drops these 
injuries. 
67 The main results are not sensitive to this restriction.  The results are qualitatively similar when the 
sample is cut to preserve injuries with at least 25 or 500 injuries each period. 
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to-work for claimants having incentivized injuries, who return to work in an average of 
about two weeks.  This suggests the state may have chosen to incentivize the most costly 
workplace injuries.  Although this may be a desirable policy, it means that non-
incentivized injuries might not be an ideal comparison group.  To address this concern, I 
present results for the whole stock of injuries as well as those with three-digit ICD-9 
codes comprised of both incentivized and non-incentivized injuries, a set of more 
comparable injuries.  I also conduct the analysis separately for the three most common 
types of injuries: back sprains, bruises, and cuts.  Within the samples of bruises and cuts, 
mean days away from work are rather similar for both incentivized and non-incentivized 
injuries.   
 I quantify the impact of TCMs beginning to manage claims by comparing 
duration before the TCMs were implemented (PRE) with outcomes once the TCMs were 
in place (POST1).  Since the TCMs were not initially rewarded for impacting claim 
duration and employers had little motivation to switch TCMs, duration is predicted to 
change only as a result of the infrastructure changes which are expected to impact minor 
claims.  Table 3-3 shows that mean days away from work for non-incentivized injuries 
fell from 4.4 to 3.8, a statistically significant reduction of about half of one day, or 14 
percent.68  Similarly, mean days away from work declined among claims having 
incentivized injuries, from 14.1 to 12.5.  Table 3-3 also shows how changes in the mean 
are driven by changes across the distribution of days away from work.  There is a modest 
decline in days away from work throughout the whole distribution of claim duration.  For 
example, among claims having non-incentivized injuries the 75th percentile fell from four 
                                                 
68 Reported results are weighted by the inverse of the predicted probability a worker has valid return-to-
work information.  As expected, descriptive statistics for days away from work are sensitive to weighting. 
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days in PRE to three days in POST1.  Similarly, among incentivized injuries the 75th 
percentile dropped from five to four days.  These decreases in days away from work are 
consistent with infrastructure changes successfully reducing duration across the 
distribution of claim duration, and I will investigate whether this conclusion persists after 
controlling for the composition of injured workers.   
 To assess the impact of the bonus payment, I compare outcomes for injured 
workers when the TCMs are managing claims (POST1) with outcomes once the bonus is 
in place (POST2).  This approach assumes all infrastructure changes were realized in 
POST1 and the only differences in duration in POST2 arise from the bonus payment.  
Since the bonus does not apply to non-incentivized injuries, I expect to find no further 
change in duration among non-incentivized injuries.  As expected, Table 3-3 shows only 
modest changes in days away from work among non-incentivized injuries.  For example, 
mean duration changed from 3.8 days to 4.0, yet this difference is not statistically 
significant and there were only modest changes across the entire distribution of days 
away from work.   
For incentivized injuries, the TCMs are predicted to have heterogeneous 
responses to the bonus payment.  Only infrastructure changes impact duration before the 
TCM learns of the claim, so no change in duration is expected between POST1 and 
POST2 for minor injuries.  After one week, TCMs are predicted to actively reduce claim 
duration until the claim exceeds the threshold beyond which the bonus payment increases 
if the claim misses more than 15 months.  At that point, I expect duration to increase.  
Therefore, the expected impact of the bonus on mean days away from work for 
incentivized injuries is ambiguous because the predicted heterogeneous responses may 
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offset one another.  Overall, I find mean days away from work increased for claims 
having incentivized injuries after the bonus was in place, from 12.5 days in POST1 to 
15.6 days in POST2, and this change is statistically significant.  To ascertain how this 
increase was driven by changes across the distribution of claim duration, I compare the 
distributions of days away from work in POST1 and POST2.  With the exception of the 
right hand tail of the distribution, the implementation of the bonus payment did not 
appear to induce any further change in days away from work.  The 99th percentile of days 
away from work, however, increased enormously, from 220 days in POST1 to 343 days 
in POST2.  This is consistent with case managers increasing duration for severe claims in 
order to have the claims excluded from the bonus payment.69 
 To illustrate that these changes were timed with the bonus payment’s 
implementation, Figures 3-4a-3-4d depict changes over time for selected quantiles of the 
weighted distribution of claim duration, separately for claims having incentivized and 
non-incentivized injuries.70  The first vertical line marks the quarter when the TCMs 
began managing claims (1997, Q1), and the second vertical line marks the quarter when 
the bonus payment was implemented (1999, Q2).  Before the TCMs were in place, the 
85th percentile for claims with incentivized injuries ranged from seven to 13 days away 
from work, and the corresponding percentile for claims with non-incentivized injuries 
                                                 
69 Although 15 months corresponds to approximately 457 days, and the increase in days away from work at 
the 99th percentile still has claimants returning to work before 15 months pass, this increase is consistent 
with the predicted strategic behavior of TCMs.  The bonus payment is paid quarterly and only includes 
claims that returned to work before the a new calendar quarter begins.  Once a claim has missed five 
consecutive calendar quarters, the spell away from work is never included in the bonus payment calculation 
(the 15-month provision).  It follows that once a spell extends more than four calendar quarters, the spell 
will only count against the TCM in the calculation of one bonus payment.  The increase from 220 days to 
343 days pushes a claimant from two quarters away from work to nearly four quarters.  Instead of being 
included in three bonus payment calculations, this spell is only included twice.     




was between five and six days away from work.  Once the TCMs began to manage 
claims, days away from work fell slightly for all claims.  After the bonus was put in 
place, there was an additional (slight) decline at the 85th percentile of days away from 
work for claims having incentivized injuries.  Similar trends arose at the 90th percentile, 
and there was little change in duration among claims at the 95th percentile—and possibly 
a slight increase after the bonus is in place.  The very top of the distribution, the 99th 
percentile, follows a totally different pattern.  Once the bonus payment was introduced, 
the duration of claims with incentivized injuries increased dramatically.   
As shown in Table 3-3, claims having incentivized injuries also experienced a 
slightly larger and statistically significant increase in the share of claims spanning more 
than 15 months (.0054 to .0085) whereas the change among claims with non-incentivized 
injuries was more modest (.00028 to .00046).  One mechanism TCMs might use to 
increase duration is enrollment in vocational rehabilitation.  Claims having incentivized 
injuries experienced a large, statistically significant increase in the share of claims 
receiving vocational rehabilitation (.0109 to .0164), whereas the increase for claims 
having non-incentivized injuries was smaller and not statistically significant (.0011 to 
.0014).  As shown in Figure 3-5, this increase in vocational rehabilitation was timed with 
the policy change. 
The descriptive statistics suggest that increases in duration were concentrated 
among the top one percent of all claims.  Although this is a small share of all claims, 
these injuries comprise a substantial share of WC costs, as shown in Table 3-4.  Column 
(1) details the days away from work in the PRE period for non-incentivized injuries from 
the 80th through the 99th percentile.  In column (2), I present the share of cash benefits 
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accrued by injured workers at or above the corresponding percentile.  For example, in the 
PRE period, 99 percent of cash benefits were conferred to injured workers above the 80th 
percentile in the distribution of claim duration (four days).71  Approximately 72 percent 
of all cash benefits were paid to injured workers at or above the 98th percentile, and over 
half of all cash benefits accrued to injured workers at or above the 99th percentile.  I 
observe a similar pattern among incentivized injuries.  Claimants in the top percentile 
received 42 percent of all cash benefits.  Although the increase in duration was 
concentrated among a small share of claimants, these individuals comprise a 
disproportionate share of program costs. 
These changes observed in the descriptive data are consistent with the policy 
reforms having a measurable effect.  However, it is also possible the observed patterns 
are caused by changes in the composition of injured workers.  In Tables 3-5 and 3-6 I 
examine how the composition of injured workers changed over time.  Table 3-5 lists the 
most common injuries by incentivized status.72  The share of claimants with the two most 
common injuries did not change substantially over time.  Roughly 12 percent of all 
claimants having a non-incentivized injury were diagnosed with an open wound of the 
forearm, and 18 percent of claims having an incentivized injury were diagnosed with an 
open wound of the finger.  However, for many diagnoses, the changes over time are 
statistically significant.  Therefore, it will be important to carefully control for the 
composition of injuries when analyzing the impact of the policy changes on claim 
duration. 
                                                 
71 Some injured workers do not miss any work immediately after their injury but are forced to miss at least 
one day after a week has passed (e.g., for doctor’s appointments).  Since more than one week has passed, 
the worker receives cash benefits for that day.  This explains why less than 100 percent of cash benefits 
accrue above the 80th percentile. 
72 The composition of injuries over time is sensitive to weighting. 
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In Table 3-6, I present summary statistics for the demographic and job 
characteristics that are related to the ease with which a worker will be able to heal and 
return to work.73  For example, the WC literature has established that women return to 
work more slowly than men and older workers return to work more slowly than younger 
workers (e.g., Krueger, 1991; Ruser et al., 2004).  Some modest changes over time in the 
composition of injured workers suggest some of the observed increases in duration might 
have been driven by sample composition changes.  In the PRE period, over 70 percent of 
all claimants were male, approximately half were married, and the average age was about 
33.  Consistent with general labor market trends, in POST2 women comprised a larger 
share of injured workers and the claimants were slightly older.  These changes confirm 
that it is particularly important to control for demographic characteristics to ensure that 
any observed increase in days away from work is not simply a result of these sample 
composition changes or the differences between the two groups of injuries.  Some jobs 
are better able to accommodate injured workers than others.  Therefore, it is also 
important to control for the claimant’s occupation.  As shown in the bottom of Table 3-6, 
most injured workers are service workers, production workers, or laborers.  In the next 
section, I turn to a formal analysis of claim duration as a function of the policy changes, 
controlling for a worker’s injury, demographic, and job characteristics. 
 
3.5 Measuring the Impact of the Return-to-Work Bonus Payment 
The basic empirical strategy I employ compares the change in days away from work 
arising from the implementation of the bonus payment for claims having an incentivized 
injury (treatment group) with the change in duration over the same period for claims not 
                                                 
73 Descriptive statistics for demographic and job characteristics are not sensitive to weighting. 
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having an incentivized injury (comparison group).  I include claims not having 
incentivized injuries to capture any underlying trends over time in days away from work 
so that I can better isolate the impact of the bonus payment.  The identifying assumption 
that will lead me to draw a correct causal interpretation of the results is that any trend 
influencing claim duration has the same effect on days away from work for claims having 
incentivized and non-incentivized injuries.  This is a nontrivial assumption because 
different types of injuries are granted incentivized or non-incentivized status, and mean 
duration is different for the two groups.  I address this issue in two ways.  First, I can 
quantify whether or not the comparison group reasonably controls for other trends by 
testing whether the two groups receive similar treatment in the period before the bonus 
payment was in place.  Between 1997 and the bonus payment’s implementation in 1999, 
the TCMs had no reason to treat workers with the two classes of injuries any differently 
from one another.  Therefore, I test whether or not the two groups received equal 
treatment during this period.  Second, I examine the main results within four samples of 
more comparable injuries. 
I investigate whether or not the observed changes in mean days away from work 
persist once I control for injury, demographic, and job characteristics.  Using Ordinary 
Least Squares, I estimate days away from work using the following specification: 
 





where i references the claimant, j the diagnosis, and t the year of injury.74  Days away 
from work is a function of having an injury which will qualify for the bonus, captured in 
the vector of diagnosis code fixed effects γ; an indicator for the period when the TCMs 
are in place but the bonus is not, POST1; and an indicator for the second policy change 
when the TCM and the bonus are both in place, POST2.75  Let INCENT identify those 
claims assigned one of the 266 incentivized codes.76  The interactions between 
POST1*INCENT and POST2*INCENT are the main variables of interest.  The vector X 
includes job and demographic characteristics, as well as month indicators to control for 
the seasonality of workplace injuries.  The vector η contains year fixed effects.77  
Standard errors are clustered by injury code. 
The estimates for λ1 and λ2 capture the impact of the TCMs in POST1 and POST2 
on all claims, and I expect the coefficients will be zero or negative.  The policy changes 
are only predicted to impact claims with non-incentivized injuries through infrastructure 
changes, such as the TCM insurance cards.  These infrastructure changes are likely to 
have a negative effect on the duration of claims having minor injuries but no effect 
among particularly severe injuries.  The coefficients λ3 and λ4 capture any average 
differential impact of the TCMs on claims having incentivized injuries.  Since the TCMs 
were in place for two years before the bonus was implemented, I can check the 
assumption that the comparison group reasonably controls for other trends by examining 
claim duration for the two groups during this intermediate period.  A priori, the 
                                                 
74 The main qualitative results are confirmed using a Cox proportional hazard analysis.  To address the 
skewness of the data, I also estimated negative binomial models.  The general conclusions of the paper are 
upheld in these models, even on the sample of all injuries. Results available upon request. 
75 In this case, the left out category is PRE, the period before the TCMs are in place (1/95-2/97). 
76 The variable INCENT is not included by itself because it is perfectly correlated with γ. 
77 The job characteristics are 1-digit industry, 1-digit occupation, the employer’s experience rate in the year 
of injury, and indicators for whether or not the employer is large or risky enough to be experience rated. 
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introduction of the TCMs, without the bonus in place, is not predicted to have a 
differential impact on treatment group claims.  If this is the case, the coefficient on 
POST1*INCENT will be zero.  In general, if the bonus induces treatment group claimants 
to return to work more quickly (slowly) on average, the coefficient on POST2*INCENT 
will be negative (positive).  In the full sample comprised of injuries of all levels of 
severity, the expected sign of the coefficient on POST2*INCENT is theoretically 
ambiguous.  The TCMs are expected to decrease duration for claims having moderately 
severe injuries and increase duration for some claims having severe injuries. 
 Results for the full sample are presented in Table 3-7, column (1).  As expected, 
the coefficients on POST1 and POST2 are negative and small in magnitude (-.18 and -
.93, respectively), and they are not statistically significant.  This implies no aggregate 
impact of the TCMs on all claims.  The TCM does not appear to have a differential effect 
on incentivized injuries, as captured by POST1*INCENT and POST2*INCENT.  As 
expected, the coefficient on POST1*INCENT is -.60 and not statistically significant, 
suggesting claims having non-incentivized injuries are a reasonable comparison group.  
The coefficient on POST2*INCENT is 1.25 and is also not statistically significant. 
To address concerns that differences in the set of injuries comprising the 
incentivized and non-incentivized groups drive the findings, columns (2) through (5) 
contain results for subsamples with more homogenous injuries.  In column (2), only those 
five-digit diagnosis codes that aggregate up to a three-digit ICD-9 code having both 
incentivized and non-incentivized injuries are included.  For example, “847, Sprain and 
strain of back,” is comprised of both incentivized (847.20) and non-incentivized (847.10) 
diagnosis codes.  Therefore, all sprains and strains of the back are included in this 
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subsample whereas cases of carpal tunnel syndrome are excluded because all 
corresponding 5-digit codes are incentivized.  Columns (3) through (5) further restrict the 
sample to three of the most common types of injuries: back sprains, bruises, and cuts.  As 
in the full sample, in every case, the coefficients on POST1 and POST2 are small in 
magnitude and not statistically significant.  Estimates for POST1 fall between -2.6 and 
.32, and estimates for POST2 fall between -2.3 and -.04.  In only two of the samples does 
the TCM appear to have a differential effect on incentivized injuries, as captured by the 
interaction terms POST1*INCENT and POST2*INCENT.  In column (3), the coefficient 
on POST1*INCENT is –2.95, and statistically significant, implying case managers reduce 
duration for incentivized back injuries by nearly three more days than for non-
incentivized back injuries.  The sample of back sprains experiences large changes in 
composition over this time period, and this change is concentrated among incentivized 
injuries.78  Although this implies back sprains may not be the best group of injuries 
within which to quantify the policy change, I include this sample in the analysis because 
they are common, costly workplace injuries.  Injured workers suffering back injuries 
comprise 30 percent of all cash benefit claims and receive over 50 percent of cash 
benefits paid.  The coefficient on POST2*INCENT  is positive and significant for both 
back sprains (1.865) and bruises (.687), but these increases are small in magnitude and 
sensitive to outliers.  In general, the other coefficients are of the expected sign.  Claim 
                                                 
78 In Appendix C, I estimate the probability a claim receives cash benefits as a function of the policy 
change, controlling carefully for injury, job, and demographic characteristics.  The sample of back sprains 
is the only group of injuries for which there are systematic changes in the probability of receiving cash 




duration is shorter for men and longer for older workers.79  Managers, service workers, 
and support personnel return to work more quickly than laborers.80 
 
3.5.1 Heterogeneous Effects 
Results from the above specification tell no consistent story of the impact of the TCMs or 
the bonus payment on days away from work.  However, the structure of the bonus 
payment suggests heterogeneous responses that may offset one another.  Therefore, to 
quantify the effect of these policy reforms on claim duration, I must allow the impact to 
vary for claims of different levels of severity.  Following Meyer et al. (1995), I examine 
these differential responses using quantile regression estimates analogous to equation (1).  
Quantile regression allows me to estimate the impact of the bonus payment at different 
points in the response distribution, conditional on the covariates.  There is so little 
variation in days away from work at the bottom of the distribution of claim duration 
(among medical only claims of one week or less) that it is only interesting (and feasible) 
to examine the results across quantiles for cash benefit claims.  If the bonus induces 
TCMs to attempt to reduce duration for moderately severe injuries, then the coefficient 
on POST2*INCENT will be negative for the lower quantiles.  Once duration exceeds the 
threshold beyond which it benefits the TCM for the claim to extend more than 15 months, 
the bonus should lead to either no change or increased duration.  Thus, I expect the 
coefficient on POST2*INCENT will be large and positive for the higher quantiles.   
                                                 
79 Married workers return to work more slowly than single workers.  This finding is consistent with much 
of the previous literature (e.g., Krueger (1991)) and may reflect a second earner’s ability to smooth income. 
80 Following Evans and Owens (forthcoming), I also control for pre period trends in duration by allowing 
for separate linear trends for the deciles of the distribution of pre period duration.  I only include those 
injuries falling in deciles with both treatment and comparison group claims.  Restricting the sample in this 
way does not change the qualitative results for days away from work, nor do the conclusions change when I 
allow for different time trends for each bin.  Results available upon request. 
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The key results from quantile regression are shown in Figures 3-6a and 3-6b.  In 
Figure 3-6a, the solid line depicts the coefficient on POST1*INCENT from 20 quantile 
regressions on the sample of cash benefit claims, from the 5th through the 95th, and also 
including the 99th.  The outer dashed lines bound the 90 percent confidence interval.  The 
change in days away from work is always close to zero and is never statistically 
significant.  The results are quite different in the analogous plot for the coefficient on 
POST2*INCENT, as shown in Figure 3-6b.  Below the 30th percentile, the coefficient is 
negative but not statistically significantly different than zero.  Although this result does 
not reflect the predicted decline in duration for moderately severe claims, it suggests 
there was no change in duration for these claims.  From the 30th to the 80th percentiles, 
the coefficient is positive, between .13 and 7.34, but still not statistically significantly 
different than zero.  Above the 80th percentile, the coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant, between 15 and 105 days.  These findings are consistent with the bonus 
increasing duration for claims that exceed the 15-month threshold.  However, these 
estimates do not allow me to pinpoint whether or not the observed increase reflects this 
strategic behavior because quantile regression describes changes to the response 
distribution, conditional on all of the covariates.81   
To further quantify the impact of the policy changes, I examine changes in 
duration separately for medical only and cash benefit claims.  I split the sample in this 
way for two reasons.  First, the policy changes are predicted to have different impacts on 
these two groups of claims.  Since TCMs do not learn of claims until an average of one 
week has passed, the only impact on medical only claims will be changes in 
                                                 
81 It is not so easy to determine what level of duration is represented by the 95th percentile, conditional on 
all of these covariates.  In addition to controls for demographic, employer, and job characteristics, each 
regression includes injury fixed effects.   
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infrastructure.  In contrast, TCMs are predicted to respond to the bonus payment and 
impact the duration of cash benefit claims.  By splitting these two groups, I can separate 
the impact of infrastructure changes from the bonus payment. Second, it is of particular 
interest to isolate the impact on cash benefit claims because they drive WC costs and 
because most WC research exclusively looks at this subset of claims (e.g., Krueger, 1991; 
Meyer et al., 1995).  Although fewer than 20 percent of injured workers receive cash 
benefits, these claims comprise over 95 percent of total costs.   
 
3.5.2 Minor Claims 
I examine the impact of the TCM and bonus payment on minor, medical only claims 
using the specification given in equation (1) for the sample of medical only claims.  
Infrastructure changes are predicted to reduce duration for all claims, so I expect to find a 
negative coefficient estimate on both POST1 and POST2.  Since most claims are not filed 
with the TCMs until one week passes, I expect to find no differential impact for 
incentivized injuries.  The results from this exercise are shown in Table 3-8.  The 
coefficients on POST1 and POST2 are statistically significant, near -.3, suggesting the 
TCMs reduced duration by about one-third of a day for all minor claims.  This 
interpretation assumes that the TCMs were the only change to duration over this time 
period.  In general, the coefficients on the interaction terms POST1*INCENT and 
POST2*INCENT are small in magnitude and not statistically significant.  This is 
expected because medical only claimants return to work before the claim is filed, so 
TCMs cannot differentiate between the two groups of claims.  The one exception is found 
in the sample of cuts.  However, the conclusion that TCMs treat all minor claims in the 
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same way, regardless of incentivized status is upheld because although the coefficients 
are statistically significant, they are not economically meaningful.  The coefficient 
estimates imply workers return to their jobs between .04 and .13 days sooner. 
 
3.5.3 Severe Claims 
Next, I estimate days away from work as a function of the policy changes on the sample 
of cash benefit claims.  In the absence of the bonus payment, only infrastructure changes 
are predicted to impact duration and these changes are expected among minor claims.  
Once the bonus is in place, the TCMs are expected to attempt to reduce claim duration 
for each claim with an incentivized injury until the claim exceeds the threshold at which 
point duration is predicted to increase.  These regressions assume a common effect of the 
bonus payment on cash benefit claims of all levels of severity, captured by the sign of the 
coefficient on POST2*INCENT.  The expected sign is theoretically ambiguous because 
the TCMs are predicted to reduce duration for some cash benefit claims and increase 
duration for others. 
These results are presented in Table 3-9.  There is variation in mean days away 
from work among the different samples.  Clearly, the cuts and bruises that receive cash 
benefits are less severe than the average back sprain eligible for cash benefits.  In every 
column, the coefficients on POST1 and POST2 are not statistically significant, suggesting 
there is no general effect of the TCMs on cash benefit claims.  In column (1), using the 
entire stock of injuries, the coefficient on POST1*INCENT is 7.15 and statistically 
significant.  This coefficient confirms that the two groups of injuries did not receive the 
same treatment before the bonus was in place.  When the sample is restricted to more 
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similar groups of injuries, as in columns (2) through (5), this coefficient estimate is 
always small in magnitude and never significant.  Therefore, within samples of common 
injuries, the TCMs do not treat claimants having incentivized injuries any differently 
before the bonus is in place.   
In general, the coefficient on POST2*INCENT is large, statistically significant, 
and an order of magnitude larger than even the statistically significant POST1*INCENT 
effect.  In the common injury sample, the coefficient estimate for POST2*INCENT is 
19.2, implying the implementation of the bonus payment increased duration for 
incentivized injuries by nearly three weeks.82   
The exception is found in the sample of cuts, a group of injuries expected to be 
unresponsive to TCM efforts.  Among cuts, the estimates for the policy variables are 
never statistically significant, suggesting the policies had no effect on claimants with that 
group of injuries.  This result is consistent with the previous literature which has found 
that claimants suffering “traumatic” injuries, such as cuts or fractured legs, are considered 
less responsive to changing benefit levels than claimants with soft tissue injuries (e.g., 
Biddle and Roberts, 2003; Biddle, 2001; Ruser, 1998; and Neuhauser and Raphael, 
2004).  If claimants are less sensitive to benefit levels, they will also likely be less 
responsive to TCM intervention.   
The finding of an increase in days away from work among incentivized cash 
benefit injuries is consistent with TCMs increasing duration for particularly severe claims 
with incentivized injuries to maximize the bonus payment.  However, this finding does 
                                                 
82 Over time, claims are less likely to be awarded cash benefits.  If the least severe claims no longer receive 
cash benefits in POST1 or POST2, these results are biased away from zero.  This is especially problematic 
if the probability of receiving cash benefits changes differentially for incentivized injuries.  In Appendix C, 
I present results from a linear probability model for the probability of cash benefit receipt.  No pattern 
emerges, but these results suggest the cleanest test is among common injuries. 
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not show directly that these increases correspond to claims becoming longer than 15 
months.    
 
3.5.4 Strategic Behavior to Increase Duration 
To investigate whether or not claims are strategically getting longer so that they are 
excluded from the computation of average days away from work, I estimate the following 
linear probability model 
 
(2) GT15si,j,t=θ0+ θ 1POST1t+ θ 2POST2t+ θ 3POST1t*INCENTj+ 
θ4POST2t*INCENTj+βXi+γj+ηt+ νi,j,t 
 
where GT15 is a dummy variable that equals one if the spell spans more than 15 months.  
 If the increase in duration corresponds to strategic behavior to maximize the 
bonus payment, then I expect the coefficient estimate for POST2*INCENT to be positive 
and the coefficients on the other policy variables to equal zero.  In Table 3-10, I present 
these results for three samples: all injuries, the common injury sample, and back sprains, 
and results from probit models are qualitatively similar.  Fewer than one-tenth of one 
percent of claimants suffering from cuts or bruises have claims extending more than 15 
months, so those samples are not included in this analysis.  The coefficients on POST1 
and POST2 are small in magnitude and never statistically significant, implying the TCMs 
did not increase claims beyond 15 months indiscriminately.  The coefficient on 
POST1*INCENT is always small in magnitude and only statistically significant in the 
case of back injuries, -.0011.  This estimate implies once the TCMs are in place, workers 
having incentivized back injuries were .11 percentage points less likely to have a claim 
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exceed 15 months.  From a base of 1.1 percent of the sample having claims so long they 
exceed 15 months, this implies a ten percent drop in the probability a claim exceeds 15 
months.  This could mean TCMs successfully reduce moral hazard among injured 
workers with back sprains in the period before the bonus is in place, or the drop may 
merely reflect the sample composition changes among back sprains.   
In each case, the coefficient on POST2*INCENT is positive and significant.  For 
example, in the sample of common injuries in column (2), the estimate is .002.  This 
implies that injured workers diagnosed with an incentivized injury are .2 percentage 
points, or 40 percent, more likely to be out of work for more than 15 months once the 
bonus is in place.  This implies TCMs engaged in strategic behavior to maximize the 
bonus payment.83 
 Although no single specification allows me to quantify the TCM response across 
the entire distribution of claim duration, together these estimates describe the impact of 
the bonus on claim duration for workers with claims of different severity.  It appears that 
TCMs are acting in ways consistent with maximizing the bonus payment.  Thus, it is not 
surprising that since the fourth quarter of 2001, over 75 percent of all TCMs have 
received the full bonus payment each quarter.  However, these results also imply that 
TCMs are behaving in ways not envisioned by the state when the bonus was constructed.  
The results are consistent with case managers increasing claim duration for severe claims 
having incentivized injuries, so that the claims extend long enough to be excluded from 
the bonus payment.  These results do not offer explanations for the mechanism used to 
                                                 
83 Estimation of a Cox proportional hazard model with time varying covariates for incentivized, cash 
benefit injuries shows that once the bonus is in place, there is a decline in the probability a worker returns 
to work the week before hitting the 15-month threshold. 
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impact duration.  To address this, in the next section I explore two potential mechanisms 
through which case managers might be able to impact duration. 
3.6 Exploring How the TCMs Achieve Results 
3.6.1 Receipt of Vocational Rehabilitation Benefits 
One method case managers might use to extend claim duration past 15 months, so that 
the claim will no longer be included in the bonus payment calculation, is to enroll 
claimants in vocational rehabilitation programs.  Vocational rehabilitation consists of job 
training and a formal job search in preparation for gainful employment in a new position.  
In Ohio, injured workers continue to receive WC cash benefits while enrolled. In 
addition, participation in vocational rehabilitation does not count as return to work for the 
purposes of the bonus payment while the benefits paid to injured workers and the cost of 
the program are borne by the state instead of the employer.  Claimants may be eligible for 
vocational rehabilitation as soon as the injury occurs but tend to enroll in the 
rehabilitation program after an average of ten months.  These programs last for an 
average of 6.5 months.  Thus, it is indeed workers near 15 months who receive vocational 
rehabilitation, with the programs lasting long enough to keep claimants away from work 
past 15 months.84   
The vocational rehabilitation must begin before the worker has missed 15 months 
of work for the rehabilitation program to be an effective mechanism for TCMs to 
strategically increase claim duration in response to the incentive payment.  Therefore, I 
estimate a linear probability model similar to equation (2), where now the dependent 
                                                 




variable, VOCLT15, equals one if the injured worker receives vocational rehabilitation 
and the program begins before the worker misses 15 months of work.  If the TCMs use 
vocational rehabilitation to strategically increase claim duration, then the coefficient 
estimate on POST2*INCENT will be positive and statistically significant, and the 
coefficient estimates on the other policy variables will be zero.  Results from this 
regression are shown in Panel A of Table 3-11.  Column (2) contains results for the 
sample of all common injuries.  The coefficient on POST1*INCENT is small (.001) and 
not statistically significant, and the coefficient on POST2*INCENT is four times as large 
(.004) and statistically significant.  Once the TCM and the bonus were in place, workers 
with incentivized injuries became .4 percentage points more likely to receive vocational 
rehabilitation, an increase of over 50 percent.  This is consistent with the hypothesis that 
case managers use enrollment in vocational rehabilitation programs to increase days 
away from work for particularly severe claims.  Results from the sample of back sprains 
and the full sample are qualitatively similar and point to between a 50 and 90 percent 
increase in the probability an injured worker receives vocational rehabilitation benefits.  
These findings lend support for one mechanism case managers may use to extend claim 
duration, thereby corroborating the estimated increase in duration for claims having 
severe incentivized injuries.   
I interpret the results in Panel A as evidence case managers use enrollment in 
vocational rehabilitation to increase duration for claims so that they last longer than 15 
months.  One concern with this interpretation is that claims having incentivized injuries 
may be more attractive candidates for vocational rehabilitation, and the coefficient on 
POST2*INCENT merely captures the increased use of vocational rehabilitation over time.  
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I can rule out this explanation by examining whether claims having incentivized injuries 
have higher rates of participation in vocational rehabilitation when the programs begin 
after 15 months have passed.  Claims lasting longer than 15 months are automatically 
excluded from the bonus calculation, so the case managers have no incentive to further 
increase duration for these claimants. 85  I formally test this hypothesis by re-estimating 
equation (2) using the dependent variable VOCGT15, which equals one if the individual 
receives vocational rehabilitation benefits beginning after the worker misses at least 15 
months.  I present the coefficient estimates in Panel B; few coefficients are statistically 
significant, and no clear pattern emerges.  Therefore, in response to the bonus payment, 
TCMs appear to be strategically increasing duration for claims having incentivized 
injuries so that the claimant misses more than 15 months of work and the claim is 
excluded from the calculation of average days away from work.  Furthermore, I identify 
one tool which TCMs use to increase duration; enrolling workers in lengthy vocational 
rehabilitation programs.   
 
3.6.2 Ignoring Claims 
In the discussion of the expected effects of the TCMs on claim duration, I identify two 
possible approaches TCMs might take to manage claims having severe incentivized 
injuries.  The TCM might increase duration for some of these claims by enrolling injured 
workers in vocational rehabilitation.  Some claims will remain away from work longer 
than 15 months in the absence of any intervention.  The TCM might enroll these workers 
                                                 
85 Of course, TCMs may be able to increase duration with the promise of vocational rehabilitation 
beginning after 15 months.  In results not shown, I confirm that the main qualitative result holds when the 




in vocational rehabilitation to ensure they miss more than 15 months of work, or the 
TCM may simply ignore them.  Since it is difficult to identify which claims will remain 
away from work past 15 months and many TCMs have an additional financial incentive 
to enroll injured workers in vocational rehabilitation programs, it is an empirical question 
whether or not TCMs enroll all claims having severe incentivized injuries in vocational 
rehabilitation.  To test whether TCMs ignore any severe claims, I first quantify whether 
there are any injured workers with severe injuries not enrolled in vocational 
rehabilitation.  Next, I examine the impact of the bonus payment on these ignored 
claimants.   
Clearly, case managers have interacted with those injured workers who receive 
vocational rehabilitation benefits.  Therefore, to focus attention on claims that managers 
may have “ignored”, I restrict the sample to those injured workers who do not participate 
in those rehabilitation programs. As shown in Table 3-12, even when I exclude 
vocational rehabilitation participants, some injured workers have spells that last longer 
than 15 months.  Approximately .3 percent of these claimants miss more than 15 months 
of work (.2 percent of the common injury sample and .5 percent of the back sprain 
sample).  Therefore, there are some severe claims that do not receive vocational 
rehabilitation, suggesting some severe claims may be ignored. 
If case managers respond to the bonus payment by ignoring claims, then 
“ignored” injured workers will remain away from work the same amount of time in both 
PRE and POST2. If this is the case, I will find no effect of the bonus payment on the 
probability a claim having an incentivized injury lasts longer than 15 months.  In Panel C, 
I present estimates from a linear probability model predicting whether a claim will span 
 
105 
more than 15 months of work (equation (2)) for the sample of claims that do not receive 
vocational rehabilitation benefits.  As expected, the coefficients are small in magnitude 
and rarely statistically significantly different than zero.  For example, in the common 
injury sample in column (2), the coefficient on POST2*INCENT is -.0005 and not 
statistically significant.  This finding lends support for case managers ignoring those 




3.7.1 Financial Impact of the Policy Changes 
Although the following calculations are only approximations based on several 
assumptions, they provide a sense of the magnitude of the costs and benefits of these 
policy changes.  I find that even without the bonus payment, the TCMs reduced claim 
duration for minor claims by an average of one-third of a day of work (see Table 3-8).  
However, in the absence of the bonus payment, the TCMs had no impact on any other 
group of claims (see Tables 3-7 and 3-9).  Getting medical only claimants back to work 
one-third of a day sooner does not change the amount of cash benefits paid.  However, 
when medical only claimants return to their jobs sooner, worker productivity increases.  
Approximately 70,000 injured workers received medical only benefits in 2002.86  Under 
the assumption that a worker’s productivity equals his or her daily wage, then the 
productivity gained for each additional day worked averaged $88 per day in 2002, 
                                                 
86 These are weighted totals, not the actual sample size. 
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generating approximately $1.8 million in productivity gains.87  This is a lower bound of 
the policy’s effect because TCMs were likely paid less than what it would have cost the 
state to manage the same cases.  In 2002, the state paid TCMs $100 million to manage all 
claims, so even small efficiency improvements by TCMs correspond to millions of 
dollars in additional savings to the state.   
The bonus payment increased duration for cash benefit claimants diagnosed with 
incentivized injuries by an average of 20 days (see Table 3-9) and had no impact on any 
other group of claims (see Tables 3-7 and 3-8).  Nearly 9,000 cash benefit claimants had 
incentivized injuries in 2002.  This corresponds to an increase of approximately 180,000 
days away from work.  The cost of these additional days away from work was at least the 
amount of the cash payments to workers, which averaged $59 per day, for a total of $10.6 
million.  These missed days of work also generated productivity losses totaling $15.8 
million.  Thus, I estimate the additional cash payments and lost productivity may have 
cost Ohio approximately $26.4 million per year. Estimated costs to the state are even 
larger when I also consider the mechanism TCMs use to increase duration, enrollment in 
vocational rehabilitation.  I estimate that 265 individuals received rehabilitation because 
of the bonus payment, and the average cost of the program was close to $50,000 per 
participant.88  This corresponds to $13.0 million in additional costs for vocational 
rehabilitation.89  Thus, when I include the costs of vocational rehabilitation, I estimate the 
bonus payment may cost the state up to $39.4 million per year.   
                                                 
87 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 2003.  
88 In 2002, the state paid $55.3 million to vocational rehabilitation providers, and 1,125 individuals 
received vocational rehabilitation. 
89 Although the rehabilitation programs may make workers somewhat more productive than they otherwise 




In this chapter, I examine the impact of a bonus payment intended to reduce claim 
duration among Ohio WC recipients and find evidence of costly unintended 
consequences.  As more government programs incorporate performance-based incentives, 
understanding effective contracts becomes even more important.  The lessons of this case 
study may generalize to public WC programs in other states, to private WC insurers or 
employers wishing to contract out WC case management services, and possibly even to 
other public programs.  In the late 1990s, Ohio contracted out WC case management 
services to TCMs and incorporated a bonus payment intended to reward TCMs for 
expediting return-to-work.  The incentives were such that one would expect 
heterogeneous effects along the timeline of a claim: no impact for claims before the TCM 
learns of the injury, efforts to reduce days away from work as soon as the TCM learns of 
the claim, and an increase in days away from work for claims near 15 months, at which 
point claims are excluded from the bonus payment.  My results show that the bonus 
impacts days away from work, and the changes correspond to these predictions.  The 
strongest evidence suggests the bonus payment induces TCMs to increase days away 
from work for claims having incentivized injuries.  I show that the TCMs may use 
enrollment in vocational rehabilitation programs to extend the length of some claims, and 
the net effect is an increase in overall days away from work.  I estimate these additional 
days away from work may cost the state $26.4 million in additional cash benefits and lost 
productivity per year.   
The conclusions of this paper are consistent with much of the previous empirical 
literature studying government contracts (e.g., Duggan, 2004; Heckman et al., 2002).  As 
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in these other studies, I find that contractors respond to the incentives in the contract, 
sometimes in ways inconsistent with the program goals.  In the case of Ohio WC, the 
state may choose to restructure the bonus payment to reduce the incentive to increase 
duration.  More generally, this should caution public entities to carefully anticipate 
strategic behavior when crafting the structure of performance-based incentives.   
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Tables for Chapter 3 
 
 
Table 3-1: Most Common Injuries by Eligibility for Bonus Payment 
Non-Incentivized Injuries Incentivized Injuries 
  
Open wound, elbow/forearm/wrist (881.00) Open wound of finger (883.00) 
  
Sprain and strain of back, thoracic (847.10) Sprain and strain of back, lumbar (847.20) 
  
Contusion, chest wall (922.10) Open wound of hand (882.00) 
  
Open wound of scalp (873.00) Sprain and strain of lower back (846.00) 
  
Open wound of forehead (873.42) Superficial injury of cornea (918.10) 
  
Toxic effect of venom (989.50) Sprain and strain of ankle (845.00) 
  
Contusion, knee and lower leg (924.10) Sprain and strain of neck (847.00) 
  
Sprain and strain, other (848.80) Foreign body in eye, cornea (930.00) 
  
Toxic effect of gas/vapor (987.90) Contusion, finger (923.30) 
  
Open wound of hip/thigh (890.00) Sprain and strain, shoulder/upper arm 
(840.90) 
  
Sprain and strain, pelvis (848.50) Sprain and strain of wrist (842.00) 
  
Conjunctivitis (372.30) Contusion, wrist and hand (923.20) 
  
Broken tooth (873.63) Contusion, face, scalp, and neck (920.00) 
  
Dermatitis (692.90) Sprain and strain, knee/leg (844.90) 
  
Superficial keratitis (370.24) Contusion, knee (924.11) 
  
Open wound of face (873.40) Contusion, foot (924.20) 
  
Contusion, hip and thigh (924.00) Foreign body in eye, other (930.90) 
  
Burn, eye (940.90) Open wound of knee, leg, and thigh (891.00) 
  
Sprain and strain, ribs (848.30) Sprain and strain, hand (842.10) 
  
Electrocution (994.80) Contusion, elbow (923.11) 
  
Source: Author’s calculations using Ohio administrative claims data. 
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Table 3-2: Sample Composition 
  Full Sample  Medical Only  Cash Benefit 
Number of claims  1,609,252  1,309,466  299,786 
       
First claim for each injured workera  1,092,981  885,838  207,143 
       
Claim has valid diagnosis information  1,089,794  885,090  204,704 
       
Claim was not awarded death benefit within three years of 
injury 
 1,089,733  885,090  204,643 
       
Claim is not missing demographic, job, employer, or TCM 
information 
 963,675  776,003  187,672 
       
Claimant did not receive permanent disability benefits or a 
lump sum benefit within three years of injury 
 897,880  775,062  122,818 
       
Claimant between ages 18 and 64  869,637  750,440  119,197 
       
Claim has valid return-to-work informationb  547,096  480,525  66,571 
       
Diagnosis has claims with information each periodc  530,316  465,844  64,472 
       
Diagnosis has at least 100 claims in each period  491,533  437,814  53,719 
       
       
Common injury sample  130,291  116,142  14,149 
       
Back injury sample  78,701  61,918  16,783 
       
Sample of cuts, excluding head injuries and complications  120,939  118,239  2,700 
       
Sample of bruises/contusions  87,638  83,586  4,052 
       
aWorkers are identified by employer, date of birth, and gender 
bTo have valid return to work information, cash benefit recipients must have checks itemized with one of three types of benefits (Temporary Total 
Disability benefit receipt, Living Maintenance (paid while worker is in Vocational Rehabilitation) or Non-Working Wage Loss) and the benefits must 
be paid within the same quarter the worker was injured or within one week of injury (if they begin in a subsequent quarter).  Medical only recipients 
must (1) have a valid return to work date and (2) this return to work date must fall within eight days of the injury. 
cIf diagnosis has both medical only and cash benefit claims, both types of claims must be represented in each period to meet this criteria 
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Table 3-3: Characterizing Claim Duration  
  Non-Incentivized Injuries  Incentivized Injuries  
  PRE  POST1  POST2  PRE  POST1  POST2 PREnon=PREinc 
Full Sample             t-statistic 
              















              
Distribution of Days Away from Work (Percentiles)          
1st  1  1  1  1  1  1  
5th   1  1  1  1  1  1  
25th  1  1  1  2  1  1  
50th  2  2  2  2  2  2  
75th  4  3  3  5  4  4  
95th  9  9  8  52  44  48  
99th  42  35  37  255  220  343  
              
Share of claims> 15 months  .00048  .00028  .00046†  .0056  .0054  .0085† -8.34 
              
Share Receive Voc. Rehab. 
 
.0005  .0011  .0014  .0082  .0109†  .0164† -10.41 
              
N  14,906  11,550  32,800  109,187  85,978  237,112  
              
              
All values are weighted by the inverse probability a claim has missing return to work information.  
† Indicates mean statistically significantly different than corresponding mean in previous period (at the ten percent level). 
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Table 3-3 (continued): Characterizing Claim Duration 
  Non-Incentivized Injuries  Incentivized Injuries  
  PRE  POST1  POST2  PRE  POST1  POST2 PREnon=PREinc 
Common Injury Sample              













              
Share of claims> 15 months  .00086  .00030  .00057  .00536  .00437  .00693† -5.04 
              
Share Receive Voc. Rehab. 
 
.0007  .0020†  .0022  .0081  .0101†  .0141† -6.80 
              
N  6,988  5,480  15,650  25,566  20,054  56,553  
              
Sample of Back Injuries              













              
Share of claims> 15 months  .0028  .0010  .0016  .0114  .0085†  .0140† -3.37 
              
Share Receive Voc. Rehab. 
 
.0027  .0068†  .0065  .0181  .0211†  .0289† -4.85 
              
N  1,796  1,582  4,542  18,216  14,854  37,711  
Sample of Bruises              













              
Share of claims> 15 months  .0004  0  .0003  .0005  .0006  .0010 -.25 
              
Share Receive Voc. Rehab. 
 
0  0  .0006  .0008  .0009  .0020† -1.37 
              
N  2,331  1,811  5,177  18,605  15,530  44,184  
              
Sample of Cuts              













              
Share of claims> 15 months  0  0  0  .0001  0  .0001 -.45 
              
Share Receive Voc. Rehab. 
 
0  0  .0007  .0002  .0001  .0003 -.60 
              
N  2,377  1,703  5,058  27,879  21,219  62,703  
All values are weighted by the inverse probability a claim has missing return to work information.  
† Indicates mean statistically significantly different than corresponding mean in previous period (at the ten percent level).
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Table 3-4: Financial Impact of Certain Percentiles in the Distribution of Claim Duration, 

































Workers at or 
Above 
Percentile 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
80 4 .99 7 .96 
     
81 4 .99 7 .96 
     
82 5 .98 7 .96 
     
83 5 .98 8 .95 
     
84 5 .98 8 .95 
     
85 5 .98 9 .95 
     
86 5 .98 10 .94 
     
87 6 .97 13 .93 
     
88 6 .97 14 .93 
     
89 6 .97 18 .90 
     
90 6 .97 20 .88 
     
91 7 .96 24 .85 
     
92 7 .96 28 .83 
     
93 8 .96 34 .80 
     
94 8 .96 42 .77 
     
95 9 .96 52 .73 
     
96 12 .95 66 .68 
     
97 17 .89 86 .62 
     
98 24 .72 126 .55 
     
99 42 .56 255 .42 
All values are weighted by the inverse probability a claim has missing return to work information.
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Table 3-5: Share of Claims with Most Common Injuries Over Time (5-digit ICD-9 code in parentheses) 
 Non-Incentivized Injuries   Incentivized Injuries 
 PRE POST1 POST2   PRE POST1 POST2 
         
Open wound, elbow/ forearm .126 .120 .124  Open wound of finger  .185 .182 .180 
         
Sprain back, thoracic  .121 .134† .142†  Sprain back, lumbar .079 .085† .084 
         
Contusion, chest wall  .074 .069 .069  Open wound of hand  .049 .051† .049† 
         
Open wound of scalp  .072 .059† .069†  Sprain and strain of lower back  .049 .046 .046† 
         
Open wound of forehead  .060 .050† .054  Superficial injury of cornea  .036 .027† .033† 
         
Toxic effect of venom  .058 .044† .047  Sprain and strain of ankle  .035 .036 .041† 
         
Contusion, knee/lower leg  .052 .052 .055  Sprain and strain of neck  .032 .029† .032† 
         
Sprain and strain, other  .038 .044† .045  Foreign body in eye, cornea  .031 .029† .023† 
         
Toxic effect of gas/vapor  .032 .034 .024†  Contusion, finger  .027 .029† .026† 
         
Open wound of hip/thigh  .034 .027† .028  Sprain, shoulder/upper arm  .026 .030† .030 
         
Sprain and strain, pelvis  .030 .036† .032†  Sprain and strain of wrist  .025 .027† .029† 
         
Conjunctivitis  .024 .019† .020  Contusion, wrist and hand  .025 .027† .026 
         
Broken tooth  .023 .024 .016†  Contusion, face, scalp, neck  .025 .025 .027† 
         
Dermatitis  .023 .027† .028  Sprain and strain, knee/leg  .023 .025† .029† 
         
Superficial keratitis  .020 .024† .024  Contusion, knee  .023 .024 .025† 
         
Open wound of face  .019 .017 .015  Contusion, foot .020 .020 .019† 
         
Contusion, hip and thigh  .019 .017 .017  Foreign body in eye, other  .019 .025† .018† 
         
Burn, eye  .018 .020 .014†  Open wound: knee, leg, thigh  .015 .015 .015 
         
Sprain and strain, ribs  .016 .016 .014  Sprain and strain, hand  .013 .014† .013† 
         
Electrocution  .016 .013† .016†  Contusion, elbow  .011 .011 .011 
         
Other .130 .154 .145  Other .253 .242 .244 
All means are weighted by the inverse probability a claim has missing return to work information. 
† Indicates mean statistically significantly different than corresponding mean in previous period (at the ten percent level).
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Table 3-6: Demographic and Job Characteristics  
  Non-Incentivized Injuries  Incentivized Injuries   
  PRE  POST1  POST2  PRE  POST1  POST2  t statistic 
PREnon-inc 
=PREinc 
             
Demographic characteristics             
Male  .762  .758  .747†  .703  .688†  .671†  14.96 
Married  .496  .440†  .425†  .500  .448†  .430†  -.90 













               
Ages 18-29  .438  .443  .437  .425  .434†  .421†  3.01 
Ages 30-39  .302  .285†  .269†  .300  .285†  .272†  .28 
Ages 40-49  .168  .176†  .189†  .179  .186†  .199†  -3.36 
Ages 50-59  .075  .076  .087†  .079  .078  .090†  -1.50 
Ages 60-64  .018  .020  .017†  .017  .016†  .018†  .58 
               
Occupation               
Manager  .041  .050  .039†  .039  .051†  .039†  1.35 
Service worker  .258  .238†  .259†  .298  .284†  .314†  -10.07 
Support  .057  .064†  .066  .060  .070†  .070  -1.46 
Production  .405  .396  .363†  .392  .373†  .342†  3.09 
Laborer  .217  .220  .238†  .198  .201  .214†  5.47 
               
N  14,906  11,550  32,800  109,187  85,978  237,112   
All means are weighted by the inverse of the predicted probability a claim has valid return to work information. 
† Indicates mean statistically significantly different than corresponding mean in previous period (at the ten percent level). 
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Table 3-7: Characterizing Claim Duration, Results from Ordinary Least Squares  
 (1) (2)   (3) (4) (5) 





































































































        










        










        










        
N 491,533 130,291   78,701 87,638 120,939 
        
R
2
 .212 .032   .017 .009 .006 
        












        
p-value: Coefficients on 
POST1*INCENT,  
POST2*INCENT equal 
.014 .030   .0001 .149 .018 
POST1 refers to the period when the TCMs are in place but the incentive is not (3/97-3/99) and POST2 
refers to the period when the TCMs and incentive are in place (4/99-6/02).  INCENT=1 if the claim has an 
incentivized injury.  Each regression also includes year and month dummy variables and injury fixed 
effects (five-digit ICD-9 codes) as well as employer characteristics (experience rating and method of 
rating); 1-digit industry; and TCM fixed effects.  The left out occupation is Laborer.  Standard errors are 
clustered by injury (five-digit ICD-9 code).  Test statistics are from Wald tests.  Regressions are weighted 
by the inverse probability a claim has valid return-to-work information. 
* Indicates significance at the ten percent level 
** Indicates significance at the five percent level
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Table 3-8: Characterizing Claim Duration, Results from Ordinary Least Squares on the 
Sample of Medical Only Claims  
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 



































































































       










       










       










       
N 437,814 116,142  61,918 83,586 118,239 
       
R
2
 .090 .075  .022 .037 .019 
       












       
       
p-value: Coefficients on 
POST1*INCENT,  
POST2*INCENT equal 
.199 .093  .896 .083 .290 
POST1 refers to the period when the TCMs are in place but the incentive is not (3/97-3/99) and POST2 
refers to the period when the TCMs and incentive are in place (4/99-6/02).  INCENT=1 if the claim has an 
incentivized injury.  Each regression also includes year and month dummy variables and injury fixed 
effects (five-digit ICD-9 codes) as well as employer characteristics (experience rating and method of 
rating); 1-digit industry; and TCM fixed effects.  The left out occupation is Laborer.  Standard errors are 
clustered by injury (five-digit ICD-9 code).  Test statistics are from Wald tests.  Regressions are weighted 
by the inverse of the probability a claim has valid return-to-work information. 
* Indicates significance at the ten percent level 






Table 3-9: Characterizing Claim Duration, Results from Ordinary Least Squares on the 
Sample of Cash Benefit Claims  
 (1) (2)   (3) (4) (5) 



































































































        










        










        










        
N 53,719 14,149   16,783 4,052 2,700 
        
R
2
 .173 .045   .031 .050 .053 
        












        
p-value: Coefficients 
on POST1*INCENT,  
POST2*INCENT equal 
.003 .000   .001 .036 .643 
POST1 refers to the period when the TCMs are in place but the incentive is not (3/97-3/99) and POST2 
refers to the period when the TCMs and incentive are in place (4/99-6/02).  INCENT=1 if the claim has an 
incentivized injury.  Each regression also includes year and month dummy variables and injury fixed 
effects (five-digit ICD-9 codes) as well as employer characteristics (experience rating and method of 
rating); 1-digit industry; and TCM fixed effects.  The left out occupation is Laborer.  Standard errors are 
clustered by injury (five-digit ICD-9 code).  Test statistics are from Wald tests.  Regressions are weighted 
by the inverse of the probability a claim has valid return-to-work information. 
* Indicates significance at the ten percent level 
** Indicates significance at the five percent level
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Table 3-10: Probability claim spans more than 15 months, Linear Probability 
Model  
  (1)  (2)   (3) 
        
Sample:  All Injuries  Common 
Injury 
Sample 
  Back 
Sprains 
        




  -.0035 
(.0037) 
        




  -.0011** 
(.0003) 
        




  -.0020 
(.0039) 
        




  .0039** 
(.0011) 
        




  -.003** 
(.001) 
        




  .0005** 
(.0001) 
        




  -.002* 
(.001) 
        




  -.003 
(.003) 
        




  -.001 
(.001) 
        




  -.001 
(.001) 
        




  .002** 
(.001) 
        
N  491,533  130,291   78,701 
        
R
2
  .111  .009   .007 
        




 .005   .011 
 
        
p-value: Coefficients on 
POST1*INCENT,  
POST2*INCENT equal 
 .011  .028   .005 
 POST1 refers to the period when the TCMs are in place but the incentive is not (3/97-3/99) and 
POST2 refers to the period when the TCMs and incentive are in place (4/99-6/02).  INCENT=1 
if the claim has an incentivized injury.  Each regression also includes year and month dummy 
variables and injury fixed effects (five-digit ICD-9 codes) as well as employer characteristics 
(experience rating and method of rating); 1-digit industry; and TCM fixed effects.  The left out 
occupation is Laborer.  Standard errors are clustered by injury (five-digit ICD-9 code).  Test 
statistics are from Wald tests.  Linear probability models are weighted by the inverse probability 
a claim has valid return-to-work information. 
* Indicates significance at the ten percent level 
** Indicates significance at the five percent level
 
120 
Table 3-11: Probability a Claimant Receives Vocational Rehabilitation Benefits, Linear Probability Model Results  
  (1)  (2)   (3) 
Sample:  All Injuries  Common Injury Sample   Back Sprains 
Panel A: Prob. Cash Ben. Recip.  Receives Voc. Rehab. Within 15 Months of Injury     




  .002 
(.002) 




  .008** 
(.001) 
N  491,533  130,291   78,701 
R
2
  .071  .012   .008 
Mean of Dep. Var.  .007  .007   .016 
p-value: Coefficients on POST1*INCENT, POST2*INCENT equal  .003  .034   .006 
        
Panel B: Prob. Cash Ben.Recip. Receives Voc. Rehab. After 15 Months Since Injury   




  -.0035** 
(.0008) 




  -.0006 
(.0005) 
N  491,533  130,291   78,701 
R
2
  .088  .006   .004 
Mean of Dep. Var.  .004  .003   .006 
p-value: Coefficients on POST1*INCENT, POST2*INCENT equal  .599  .045   .007 
        
        
POST1 refers to the period when the TCMs are in place but the incentive is not (3/97-3/99) and POST2 refers to the period when the TCMs and incentive are in 
place (4/99-6/02).  INCENT=1 if the claim has an incentivized injury.  Each regression also includes year and month dummy variables and injury fixed effects 
(five-digit ICD-9 codes) as well as employer characteristics (experience rating and method of rating); 1-digit industry; and TCM fixed effects.  Standard errors 
are clustered by injury (five-digit ICD-9 code).  Test statistics are from Wald tests.  Linear probability models are weighted by the inverse probability a claim has 
valid return-to-work information. 
* Indicates significance at the ten percent level 
** Indicates significance at the five percent level 
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Table 3-12: Probability a Claim Spans More than 15 Months if Claimant Does Not Receive Vocational Rehabilitation Benefits, Linear 
Probability Model Results 
  (1)  (2)   (3) 
Sample:  All Injuries  Common Injury Sample   Back Sprains 




  -.0014** 
(.0003) 




  -.0006 
(.0006) 
N  486,755  129,251   77,186 
R
2  .067  .005   .004 
Mean of Dep. Var.  .003  .002   .005 
p-value: Coefficients on POST1*INCENT, POST2*INCENT equal  .063  .236   .061 
POST1 refers to the period when the TCMs are in place but the incentive is not (3/97-3/99) and POST2 refers to the period when the TCMs and incentive are in 
place (4/99-6/02).  INCENT=1 if the claim has an incentivized injury.  Each regression also includes year and month dummy variables and injury fixed effects 
(five-digit ICD-9 codes) as well as employer characteristics (experience rating and method of rating); 1-digit industry; and TCM fixed effects.  Standard errors 
are clustered by injury (five-digit ICD-9 code).  Test statistics are from Wald tests.  Linear probability models are weighted by the inverse probability a claim has 
valid return-to-work information. 
* Indicates significance at the ten percent level 
** Indicates significance at the five percent level
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Figure 3-1: Timeline of Policy Changes: Introduction of Ohio Third-Party Case 
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Marginal cost of calling portfolio of claims in week t 
 
Marginal change in TCM compensation of calling portfolio of claims in week t 
$ 
dRED time away from work if TCM 
attempts to reduce duration 
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NO CHANGE IN DURATION 






















Marginal cost of calling portfolio of claims in week t 
 
Marginal change in TCM compensation of calling portfolio of claims in week t 
Figure 3-3b: Marginal Costs and Benefits to Third-Party Case Managers (TCMs) of Reducing Claim Duration for 
Incentivized Injuries After Bonus Payment 
$ 
dRED time away from work if 
TCM attempts to reduce 
duration 
1 week 
TCM learns of claim 
dRED=15 months 











dOH>15 months dLONG>15 months 
NO CHANGE IN DURATION 



















The first vertical line corresponds to the implementation of the Third Party Case Managers (TCMs) (POST1) and 
the second vertical line corresponds to the introduction of the bonus payment (POST2).  The distributions are 
weighted by the inverse of the probability a claim has valid return to work information.   
Figures 3-4a-3-4b: Quantiles in the Distribution of Claim Duration Over Time for the 
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Incentivized Injuries Non-Incentivized Injuries
Figure 3-4d: 99th Percentile 
Figures 3-4c-3-4d: Quantiles in the Distribution of Claim Duration Over Time for the 
Sample of all Claims (Medical Only and Cash Benefit)  
The first vertical line corresponds to the implementation of the Third Party Case Managers (TCMs) (POST1) and 
the second vertical line corresponds to the introduction of the bonus payment (POST2).  The distributions are 




































The first vertical line corresponds to the implementation of the Third-Party Case Managers (POST1) 
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Figure 3-6a: Coefficient Estimates and 90-Percent Confidence Intervals for POST1*INCENT from 
Quantile Regressions on Days Away from Work 
Figure 3-6b: Coefficient Estimates and 90-Percent Confidence Intervals for POST2*INCENT from 
Quantile Regressions on Days Away from Work  
Note: The solid middle line represents the coefficients obtained by quantile regression for the variables POST1*INCENT and 
POST2*INCENT.  The outer lines bound the 90-percent confidence interval for these coefficients.  Each regression also includes 
indicators for POST1, POST2, injury fixed effects, demographic characteristics, employer characteristics, 1-digit industry, 1-digit 























Appendix A: Investigating Strategic Re-Labeling 
 
A TCM might maximize the bonus payment by strategically assigning claims as 
incentivized or non-incentivized.  In essence, the TCM may not impact duration but 
influence how claims are coded to maximize the bonus payment.  Such re-labeling 
responses are fairly widespread in response to other government programs.  There is an 
established literature finding such behavior to evade taxes (e.g., Fisman and Wei, 2004) 
and to increase hospital reimbursement after a Medicare rate reduction (e.g., Dafny, 
2005; Silverman and Skinner, 2004).  For a TCM to maximize the bonus payment by 
strategic re-labeling, the doctor would code severe injuries as non-incentivized, and 
TCMs ignore these injuries—no increase or decrease in duration.  Results presented in 
Tables 3-9 through 3-12 quantify an increase in days away from work for claims having 
incentivized injuries.  However, if doctors are re-labeling some severe injuries as non-
incentivized, then these estimated increases in duration are upper bounds of the policy’s 
impact.  These estimates exclude severe claimants re-labeled as non-incentivized, and 
duration for these injuries does not change as a result of the bonus payment.   
However, I do not anticipate finding such a re-labeling effect in this case.  The 
presence of strategic re-labeling would be more plausible if the bonus payment induces a 
reduction in claim duration, and for strategic re-labeling to be successful, TCMs must 
convince doctors to comply because the doctor diagnoses patients before the TCM learns 
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of the claim.  This may be difficult for TCMs to do because the agent who would have to 
do the re-coding, the physician, does not directly benefit from a higher bonus.90    
The doctor makes the diagnosis at the first visit, before it is known whether a 
particular claim will be longer or shorter than average.  At this appointment, the doctor 
acquires information about the expected length of a particular claim, as well as 
information needed to file the claim that is available in the administrative data: the 
injured worker’s age, gender, marital status, and occupation.91  As shown in Tables 3-7 
through 3-10, these attributes are predictors of claim duration.  For example, older, 
female claimants have above average duration.  Since the state benchmarks do not 
depend on these characteristics, one way for case managers to reduce average duration 
would be to diagnose all older, female claimants with non-incentivized injuries and vice 
versa.   
To test if this observable information has an impact on the diagnosis made by the 
doctor, I regress whether or not the claim has an incentivized diagnosis on the doctor-
observed demographic characteristics.  I allow these characteristics to vary based on the 
time period when the claim was filed, as shown in the equation below 
 
(3)     INCENTi,j,t=α0+ α1POST1t+ α2POST2t+α3PREt* Xi+ α4POST1t* Xi + α5POST2t* Xi 
+ κj +ηt+ µi,j,t 
 
where PRE*X is a vector of demographic characteristics interacted with a dummy 
variable for the PRE period and κ captures general descriptors of the injury, not the five-
                                                 
90 In the previous re-labeling literature, the agents doing the re-labeling benefit from the strategic behavior 
(e.g., the hospital employees who map a physician’s diagnosis to a Medicare Diagnosis Related Group 
(DRG), as is the case in Dafny (2005), or an exporter labeling a product to evade taxes, as in Fisman and 
Wei (2004)). 




digit ICD-9 codes.  Thus, if doctors are shifting diagnoses to manipulate the bonus 
payment, the coefficient on POST2*AGE is expected to be negative and statistically 
significantly different than the coefficients on PRE*AGE and POST1*AGE because 
before the bonus is implemented, there is no reason for doctors to strategically diagnose 
injuries.   
The results from this analysis are shown in Appendix Table A.  The results in 
Panel A quantify any differences in the probability claims are assigned incentivized 
injuries between periods.  In column (1), before the sample composition is restricted, it 
appears claims are less likely to have incentivized injuries over time.  However, once the 
sample is restricted to common injuries, there is no clear trend in the probability of being 
diagnosed with an incentivized injury.  In Panel B, I present results from equation (3).  
Only the results from the demographic characteristics interacted with POST2 are shown, 
but the results from the other two periods are quite similar.  Panel B, column (1) contains 
results from the full sample of claims.  Few coefficients are statistically significantly 
different than zero and all are small in magnitude.  The coefficient on POST2*MALE is -
.012.  In POST2, males are 1.2 percentage points, or 1.4 percent, less likely to be 
diagnosed with an incentivized injury than female workers. 92  The coefficient on 
POST2*AGE is .0008.  This suggests that an individual ten years older than an otherwise 
observably similar claimant is .0008 percentage points, or about one-tenth of one percent, 
more likely to be diagnosed with an incentivized injury once the bonus is implemented.  
These are both small effects that are inconsistent with the re-labeling hypothesis.  Since 
                                                 
92 In fact, the only statistically significant difference in the interaction terms for a demographic 
characteristic over time is found for MALE*PRE and MALE*POST2 in columns (1) and (2).  However, not 
only are both coefficients close to zero, in POST2, males are less likely to be assigned an incentivized 
injury.  This is inconsistent with the re-labeling hypothesis.   
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older workers return to work more slowly, a negative coefficient would be consistent 
with TCMs re-labeling to maximize the bonus payment.  In total, the results show no 
evidence of strategic re-labeling in any sample; the coefficients are small, rarely 
statistically significant, and often the sign is inconsistent with the re-labeling hypothesis. 
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Appendix Table A: Probability a Claim is Assigned an Incentivized Diagnosis, Linear 
Probability Model  











       






















       
R2 .39 .19  .01 .37 .82 
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R2 .39 .19  .01 .37 .82 
       
N 491,533 130,291  78,701 87,638 120,939 
       
Mean of Dep. Variable .88 .78  .90 .89 .92 
Each regression includes indicators for POST1 and POST2, year and month dummy variables, broad injury 
categories (bruised head, cut head, bruised back, eye, sprained back, bruised arm, fractured arm, cut arm, 
sprained arm, cut hand, bruised leg, fractured leg, cut leg, sprained leg, and the left out category is other), 
employer characteristics, 1-digit industry, and TCM fixed effects.  The regressions in Panel A also include 
demographic characteristics and 1-digit occupation.  The regressions in Panel B also include a vector of 
demographic and occupation characteristics interacted with PRE and POST1.  Linear probability models 
are weighted by the inverse probability a claim has valid return-to-work information. 
* Indicates significance at the ten percent level 
** Indicates significance at the five percent level
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Appendix B: Incidence of missing return to work information 







Panel A: Sample size before valid return-to-work information criteria imposed 
PRE  278,210  235,673  42,537 
POST1  243,573  212,017  31,556 
POST2  347,854  302,750  45,104 
       
Incentivized Injuries       
PRE  231,613  193,866  37,747 
POST1  204,320  176,130  28,190 
POST2  293,205  252,507  40,698 
       
Non-Incentivized Injuries       
PRE  46,597  41,807  4,790 
POST1  39,253  35,887  3,366 
POST2  54,649  50,243  4,406 
       
       
Panel B: Sample size after valid return-to-work information criteria imposed 
PRE  140,085  116,203  23,882 
POST1  108,853  91,086  17,767 
POST2  298,158  273,236  24,922 
       
Incentivized Injuries       
PRE  116,888  95,309  21,579 
POST1  91,931  75,867  16,064 
POST2  251,608  228,941  22,667 
       
Non-Incentivized Injuries       
PRE  23,197  20,894  2,303 
POST1  16,922  15,219  1,703 
POST2  46,550  44,295  2,255 
       
       
Panel C 
Share of Incentivized Injuries missing return-to-work information 
PRE  .495  .508  .428 
POST1  .550  .569  .430 
POST2  .142  .093  .443 
       
Share of Non-Incentivized Injuries missing return-to-work information 
PRE  .502  .500  .519 
POST1  .569  .576  .494 
POST2  .148  .118  .488 
PRE refers to the period before the Third-Party Case Managers (TCMs) or incentive payment are 
implemented (1/95-2/97); POST1 refers to the period when the TCMs are in place but the incentive is not 
(3/97-3/99); and POST2 refers to the period when the TCMs and incentive are in place (4/99-6/02).  There 
are 869,637 observations before the valid return-to-work information criteria is imposed, and 547,096 
observations remain after it is imposed. 
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Appendix C: Probability claim spans more than 1 week, Linear Probability Model 
 (1) (2)   (3) (4) (5) 
        
        

























































































        
N 491,533 130,291   78,701 87,638 120,939 
        
R
2
 .258 .099   .038 .023 .007 
        
Mean of Dependent 
Variable 
.123 .123   .238 .053 .025 
        
        
p-value: Coefficients on 
POST1*INCENT,  
POST2*INCENT equal 
.186 .924   .823 .099 .009 
POST1 refers to the period when the TCMs are in place but the incentive is not (3/97-3/99) and POST2 
refers to the period when the TCMs and incentive are in place (4/99-6/02).  INCENT=1 if the claim has an 
incentivized injury.  Each regression also includes year and month dummy variables and injury fixed 
effects (five-digit ICD-9 codes) as well as employer characteristics (experience rating and method of 
rating); 1-digit industry; and TCM fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered by injury (five-digit ICD-9 
code).  Test statistics are from Wald tests.  Linear probability models are weighted by the inverse 
probability a claim has valid return-to-work information. 
* Indicates significance at the ten percent level 
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